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FROM GUANTANAMO TO SYRIA: THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL CONSTITUTION IN THE AGE OF
"EXTREME VETTING"
Shawn E. Fieldst
This Article examines for the first time in scholarly literature whether and to
what extent the Constitution applies extraterritorially to immigrants abroad. In
particular, it explores whether non-detained immigrants and refugees outside the
territorial boundaries of the United States can claim constitutional protection to
challenge immigration policies and orders. The Supreme Court's recent willingness to
reconsider the limits of the political branches' "plenary power" over immigration law
and policy, coupled with the Court's recent extension of the Constitution to certain
classes of extraterritorial noncitizens, suggests that a future role may exist for
extraterritorial jurisprudence to inform constitutional immigration law. Using the
Trump Administration's inchoate doctrine of "extreme vetting" as a case study, this
Article explores how and in what circumstances the Court might make available
avenues for constitutional challenge to immigrants residing abroad. It concludes by
proposing a unified theory for extraterritorial constitutional immigration
jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
When then-candidate Donald Trump proposed a "'total and
complete shutdown' of the entry of Muslims to the United States"' in
December 2015, a bipartisan group of lawmakers and scholars decried
the proposal as immoral, impractical, and unconstitutional.2 While the
near-uniform backlash caused Trump to reframe his proposal as a
policy of "extreme vetting" for immigrants and refugees, he maintained
fealty through the rest of the campaign to his original plans.3
By the time President Trump issued Executive Order 13,7694 on
January 27, 2017, banning all migration from seven Muslim-majority
nations, many of the same politicians who criticized the proposal a year
earlier-including his Vice President-fell into line.5 Who did not fall
I Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for "Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Entering the
United States", WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015, 7:43 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
post-politics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-
muslims-entering-the-united-states/?utmterm=.a8f4809 1 alae.
2 See, e.g., Mike DeBonis, Ryan, McConnell Denounce Trump Plan to Bar Muslims from the
U.S., WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2015/
12/08/paul-ryan-joins-chorus-opposing-trumps-muslim-ban/?utmterm=.3c8bfb57568f
(noting the "tricky position in which Republican leaders find themselves when it comes to the
unpredictable Trump ... as his rhetoric has inched further toward the fringes"); Jerry Markon,
Experts: Trump's Muslim Entry Ban Idea "Ridiculous," "Unconstitutional," WASH. POST (Dec. 7,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/experts-trumps-muslim-entry-ban-idea-
ridiculous-unconsitutional/2015/12/07/d44a970a-9d47- 1e5-bce4-708fe33e3288_story.html?
utm_term=.0fac045d25ca (quoting legal scholars and experts who viewed the plan as
"impossible," "doomed by practical factors," and a "blatantly unconstitutional" exclusion that
"would make the United States a virtual pariah among nations"); cf Peter J. Spiro, Op-ed,
Trump's Anti-Muslim Plan Is Awful. And Constitutional., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2015), https://
www.nytimes.com/2015/12/10/opinion/trumps-anti-muslim-plan-is-awful-and-
constitutional.html (calling the plan "reprehensible" but constitutionally defensible under the
broad immigration powers granted to the political branches).
3 Jeremy Diamond, Trump on Latest Iteration of Muslim Ban: 'You Could Say It's an
Expansion', CNN (July 24, 2016, 11:45 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/24/politics/donald-
trump-muslim-ban-election-2016/index.html (recalling Trump's response to a suggestion on
Meet the Press that he was retreating from his "Muslim ban" proposal: "I actually don't think
it's a rollback. It fact, you could say it's an expansion.. . . People were so upset when I used the
word Muslim. Oh, you can't use the word Muslim. Remember this. And I'm OK with that,
because I'm talking territory instead of Muslim"); Ali Vitali, Donald Trump Shifts on Muslim
Ban, Calls for 'Extreme Vetting', NBC NEWS (July 18, 2016, 5:07 AM), http://
www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/donald-trump-shifts-muslim-ban-calls-extreme-
vetting-n611276 ("Trump is once again shifting the parameters of his proposed temporary ban
on Muslims entering the country, calling Sunday for 'extreme vetting' of persons from
'territories' with a history of terror-though not explicitly abandoning his previous across-the-
board ban.").
4 Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Executive Order].
5 Avi Selk, Pence Once Called Trump's Muslim Ban 'Unconstitutional.' He Now Applauds
the Ban on Refugees., WASH. POST (Jan. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
fix/wp/2017/01/28/mike-pence-once-called-trumps-muslim-ban-unconstitutional-he-just-
applauded-the-order (quoting Vice President Mike Pence's December 8, 2015 tweet that calls to
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into line were the armies of protesters, civil rights activists, and
immigration lawyers who immediately set out to challenge the law,
descending on the nation's busiest airports to meet with lawful
immigrants in transit and detained upon arrival by immigration officials
when the Order was entered.6 Over a dozen legal challenges were filed
on behalf of immigrants and their families in the first week after the
Executive Order.7 Focusing on the nationality-based nature of the travel
ban, the explicit preference in the Executive Order to prioritize refugee
applications from "minority religions," and the Administration's thinly-
veiled discriminatory motivations, these lawsuits challenged the
Executive Order on a variety of constitutional and statutory grounds.8
Seven days after the Executive Order went into effect, U.S. District
Judge James Robart issued a nationwide temporary restraining order
halting enforcement of the Order.9 A unanimous panel of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling.10 By February 16, 2017,
ban Muslims from the United States are "offensive and unconstitutional" and Defense Secretary
James Mattis's July 2016 statement that the mere suggestion of a Muslim ban could cause "great
damage" to world order).
6 See Peter Baker, Travelers Stranded and Protests Swell over Trump Order, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/29/us/politics/white-house-official-in-
reversal-says-green-card-holders-wont-be-barred.html (describing mass protests at airports led
by, inter alia, four democratic lawmakers at Dulles Airport who were barred from speaking
with immigration officials about the status of detainees); Jack Jenkins, Inside the Battle for
Immigrant Rights at Dulles Airport, THINK PROGRESS (Jan. 30, 2017, 6:32 PM), https://
thinkprogress.org/inside-the-battle-for-immigrant-rights-at-dulles-airport-d052b97ddf39#
.cxds5ismx (describing "makeshift" legal aid center assembled by the International Refugee
Assistance Project, composed of "an ever-growing team of volunteer lawyers ... crouched over
laptops and surrounded by small mountains of donated food. Some wore suits, others hoodies,
but all donned stickers with their names and legal expertise hastily scrawled across them
('Immigration lawyer!' read one, in smeared blue ink)").
7 Lauren Pearle & James Hill, 13 Legal Actions Challenging Trump's Immigration Executive
Order, ABC NEWS (Feb. 1, 2017, 6:24 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/legal-actions-
challenging-trumps-immigration-executive-order/story?id=45175192.
8 See, e.g., Complaint, Hagig v. Trump, No. 1:17-CV-00289 (D. Colo. Jan. 31, 2017), ECF
No. 1 (complaint filed by Libyan national challenging the Executive Order on Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection grounds; Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process grounds; First Amendment Establishment Clause grounds; and for violation of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)); Complaint, Sarsour v. Trump, 245 F. Supp. 3d 719
(E.D. Va. Jan. 30, 2017) (No. 1:17-CV-00120), ECF No. 1 (complaint filed by numerous Muslim
plaintiffs challenging the Executive Order on the same grounds, as well as on First Amendment
free exercise grounds); Plaintiffs Motion for Temporary Restraining Order, Washington v.
Trump, No. 2:17-CV-00141 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2017), ECF No. 3 [hereinafter Plaintiffs
Motion for TRO] (filed by Washington State, challenging the Executive Order on similar
grounds).
9 Plaintiffs Motion for TRO, supra note 8, at 4 (finding that the states "are likely to
succeed on the merits of the claims that would entitle them to relief").
10 Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1164 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) ("The
Government has not shown that it is likely to succeed on appeal on its arguments about, at
least, the States' Due Process Clause claim, and we also note the serious nature of the allegations
the States have raised with respect to their religious discrimination claims.").
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President Trump had publicly stepped away from the Order, promising
to replace it with a "substantially revised" order to secure the country
through extreme vetting," though senior White House official Stephen
Miller promised any new orders would remain fundamentally the same
as the Executive Order. 12
Since that chaotic first month of the Trump Era, the new
Administration has enacted a second, "watered down" version of the
first Executive Order13, has been dealt stinging defeats in lower courts
across the country in what has become "sprawling" litigation,14 and has
been partially, if temporarily, vindicated by the Supreme Court's
decision to allow the second Executive Order to take effect while it
awaited oral argument on the merits of the various challenges in
October 2017.15
Regardless of the ultimate outcome of litigations surrounding the
Executive Orders, Trump's inchoate and discriminatory doctrine of
extreme vetting raises two legally distinct yet interrelated issues. One,
what, if any, limits does the Constitution place on the political branches'
broad "plenary power" to control immigration? Two, assuming that
some constitutional limits exist to restrain immigration policy, which
classes of immigrants may invoke constitutional protections to enforce
these limits? In particular, to what extent can immigrants outside the
territorial borders of the United States assert constitutional protections
against invidious and otherwise impermissible immigration laws? This
Article endeavors to answer both questions, and in so doing squarely
addresses for the first time in scholarly literature how and to what extent
11 Dan Levine, Justice Department Says Trump Will Replace Travel Ban 'in the near Future,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 16, 2017, 4:38 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/justice-
department-says-trump-wiUl-replace-travel-ban-in-the-near-future us_58a61a26e4b760 2 ad5 2 ee7 6 .
12 Taylor Link, Stephen Miller Admits the New Executive Order on Immigration Ban Is Same
as the Old, SALON (Feb. 22, 2017, 2:30 PM), https://www.salon.com/2017/02/22/stephen-miller-
admits-the-new-executive-order-on-immigration-ban-is-same-as-the-old ("One of the big
differences that you are going to see in the executive order is that it is going to be responsive to
the judicial ruling which didn't exist previously .... And so these are mostly minor, technical
differences. Fundamentally, you are still going to have the same, basic policy outcome for the
country." (quoting Stephen Miller)).
13 Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 9, 2017) [hereinafter Second Executive
Order]; Jacob Pramuk, Trump May Have Just Dealt a Blow to His Own Executive Order, CNBC
(Mar. 16, 2017, 2:47 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/15/trump-may-have-just-dealt-a-
blow-to-his-own-executive-order.html ("This is [a] watered-down version of the first one. This
is a watered-down version .... And let me tell you something, I think we ought to go back to
the first one and go all the way (through the legal system), which is [what] I wanted to do in the
first place." (quoting President Trump on the Second Executive Order)).
14 David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 Nw.
U.L. REv. 583, 585 n.6 (2017) (listing the growing number of litigations and declaring that
"[the litigation over President Trump's executive order is sprawling").
15 See Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080 (2017) (granting certiorari
and staying the injunction entered by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals).
2018] 1127
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
extraterritorial constitutional jurisprudence applies to immigration law
and policy.
This Article begins by exploring the extreme deference the judicial
branch has traditionally afforded the political branches in the
immigration context and the competing theories of this so-called
plenary power.16 The expansive, absolutist position of plenary power
holds that the judicial branch cannot and will not review the
constitutional sufficiency of executive immigration actions because the
political branches alone are "invested with power over all the foreign
relations of the country," including the power to exercise "[j]urisdiction
over its own territory."17 The competing position holds that plenary
power itself is a myth, "more of a rhetorical trope than a coherent
judicial doctrine" that merely reflects the Court's historical willingness
to permit discrimination at home as well as abroad. 18
With reference to recent precedent signaling an increased
willingness to revisit immigration policies that fall out of step with
contemporary norms, this Article posits that neither extreme view of
plenary power is accurate. One need only cursorily review the case law
to conclude that plenary power is real. Yet it is "subject to important
constitutional limitations." 19 While those limitations are difficult to
precisely define, it appears from a close reading of history and precedent
that, at a minimum, immigration rules that clearly fall outside
"contemporary constitutional norms" might succumb to a
constitutional challenge.20
Having addressed the threshold question of whether anyone can
mount a successful constitutional challenge to an immigration policy,
16 See generally David A. Martin, Why Immigration's Plenary Power Doctrine Endures, 68
OKLA. L. REv. 29 (2015) (outlining the origins of and defending separation of powers
justifications for the plenary power doctrine).
17 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 603, 605-06 (1889) (holding that
immigration decisions by the legislative department are "conclusive upon the judiciary").
18 Adam Cox, Why a Muslim Ban Is Likely to Be Held Unconstitutional: The Myth of
Unconstrained Immigration Power, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 30, 2017, 10:21 AM), https://
www.justsecurity.org/36988/muslim-ban-held-unconstitutional-myth-unconstrained-
immigration-power (rejecting the theory that Trump's "immigration policies are somehow
immune from constitutional scrutiny").
19 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001) (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 941-42
(1983)) (finding that the indefinite detention of a deportable alien would violate constitutional
due process); see also Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 604 (congressional authority limited "by the
Constitution itself and considerations of public policy and justice which control, more or less,
the conduct of all civilized nations").
20 See Gabriel J. Chin, Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine? A Tentative Apology and
Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constitutional Immigration Law, 14 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 257, 259 (2000) ("[I]f a case arises which challenges discrimination on a ground
that violates contemporary constitutional norms, the Court will be faced with a new
situation.").
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the Article turns to the question of who can mount such a challenge. In
particular, the Article considers whether and to what extent the
Constitution applies extraterritorially to protect non-detained
immigrants and refugees beyond sovereign American soil.
Much of the Court's history applying the Constitution beyond our
borders has been defined by a normative tension between strict
territorialists who hold the Constitution does not apply extraterritorially
at all, and universalists who believe it applies always and everywhere.
However, in 2008, a bare majority of the Supreme Court articulated a
compromise approach in Boumediene v. Bush,21 holding that alleged
enemy combatants held at Guantinamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba had
access to the constitutional right of habeas corpus to challenge their
detention.22 Eschewing bright line normative theories, Justice Kennedy
instead adopted a practical, case-by-case approach to determining when
and how constitutional rights apply abroad.23 Kennedy's flexible,
functional test recognized that it may be "impracticable and anomalous"
to apply every provision of the Constitution "always and everywhere."24
Unfortunately, the language of Kennedy's Boumediene opinion is
maddeningly imprecise, and his reliance on normative legal principles
appears to stand in direct contradiction to his practical, easily malleable
solution.25 As one scholar observed, the breadth of lower court decisions
criticizing, distinguishing, or outright ignoring Boumediene has had the
effect of effectively "overrul[ing]" the decision, with the D.C. Circuit
notably continuing to apply a strict territorial social compact view of
extraterritoriality which Boumediene sought to discredit.26
In the face of an uncertain extraterritoriality jurisprudence, this
Article attempts to apply the various surviving extraterritorial theories
to the immigration context, again using extreme vetting generally and
the Executive Orders specifically as a case study. One quickly realizes,
unsurprisingly so, that the extent to which constitutional provisions
apply extraterritorially to immigrants and refugees abroad varies
substantially depending on the normative or consequentialist approach
21 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
22 Id. at 732.
23 See id. at 764, 766-71 (adopting a "functional approach" to extraterritoriality and fimding
that the U.S. government's total control of the naval base and lack of other complications did
not make it "impracticable and anomalous" to grant habeas protections to noncitizen "enemy
combatants" held outside U.S. sovereign soil).
24 Id. at 759 (noting the "inherent practical difficulties of enforcing all constitutional
provisions 'always and everywhere' (quoting Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922))).
25 See Jules Lobel, Separation of Powers, Individual Rights, and the Constitution Abroad, 98
IOWA L. REV. 1629, 1649-51 (2013) (criticizing "[t]he tension between Boumediene's broad
separation-of-powers rationale and its confusing and troubling pragmatic, functional test").
26 See Janet Cooper Alexander, The Law-Free Zone and Back Again, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV.
551, 555, 593-606 (2013).
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adopted. However, this exegesis helpfully illuminates certain
fundamental commonalities across all extraterritorial theories from
which a unified theory may be achieved. In short, any extraterritorial
constitutional application should focus less on the controversial notion
of extending individual rights abroad and more on the Constitution's
traditional function as a limit on the federal government's powers, both
at home and abroad.
The Article concludes by positing a unified theory of constitutional
extraterritoriality generally and its application to immigration law and
policy specifically. Recognizing the enduring legacy of plenary power
and the politically sensitive nature of transnational migration policy in
the field of foreign relations, the Article articulates a hybrid separation
of powers/functionalist approach to extraterritorial constitutional
immigration law that seeks to strike a coherent and justifiable balance
between fundamental equality norms, internationally-recognized liberty
interests, and political and diplomatic flexibility.
A few notes on what this Article will not do. First, it neither
addresses the standing of individual states or other domestic actors to
challenge the Executive Orders27, nor weighs in on the ultimate
constitutionality of the Orders. For purposes of this Article, the
Executive Order serves merely as a jumping off point for a much
broader discussion. Second, the Article does not directly address the role
of domestic immigration legislation or international treaty obligations
as independent sources of extraterritorial immigrant rights. Though an
important potential source for remedies, extraterritorial statutory
application implicates different considerations from this Article's
primary focus-extraterritorial constitutional application.28 Finally, the
Article references the potential immigration policy implications for
extending the reach of the U.S. Constitution but neither passes
judgment on nor recommends changes to existing immigration policies.
27 See, e.g., Defendants' Opposition to Plaintiff State of Washington's Motion for
Temporary Restraining Order at 9-14, Washington v. Trump, No. 2:17-CV-00141 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 2, 2017), ECF No. 50 [hereinafter Defendants' Opposition to TRO] (The
Defendants' opposition to Washington and Minnesota State requests a nationwide injunction
to halt the Executive Order, in part because these states "lack[] standing to invoke the court's
jurisdiction").
28 See Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritoriality and the Interest of the United States in
Regulating Its Own, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1441, 1457 (2014) (noting that "[e]xtraterritorial
application of constitutional rules involves a set of considerations that differ in part from those
relevant to extraterritorial application of statutory rules," because "Congress can change
[statutory] rule[s] prospectively if the court has chosen unwisely, whereas constitutional
interpretations are extremely difficult to amend under Article V").
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I. EXTREME VETTING AND IMMIGRATION LAW: HAVE WE REACHED
THE LIMITS OF PLENARY POWER?
Before one can discuss whether extraterritorial immigrants possess
constitutional rights to challenge a particular immigration policy, one
must first consider whether anyone can successfully challenge such a
policy. The Court's long history of deference in the immigration context
suggests that the political branches remain immune from constitutional
challenge to its immigration policies, even if such policies would clearly
run afoul of the Constitution in the domestic context. This so-called
plenary power enjoyed by the executive and Congress has led the Court
to "uphold[] with depressing regularity statutes discriminating on the
basis of race, sexual orientation, political activity, and sex and birth out-
of-wedlock."29 While the Court observed in 2001 that the political
branches' immigration power is "subject to important constitutional
limitations,"30 in reality the Court has never once invalidated a federal
immigration policy on constitutional grounds.31 Therefore, it is
important to consider this threshold question of whether any of
President Trump's extreme vetting immigration measures, no matter
how noxious, can successfully be challenged at all, before exploring who
can bring such challenges.
This Section briefly outlines the history and development of the
plenary power doctrine, examines the competing scholarly position that
plenary power is little more than a legal fiction, and analyzes recent
Court precedent to posit a middle position: that plenary power is real
but has substantive constitutional limits, and that Trump's expressly
discriminatory policies may finally present the Court "with a strong case
to test" these limits.32
A. The "Unreviewable" Executive: The Doctrine of Plenary Power
"The plenary power doctrine, traditionally traced to the Supreme
Court's decision in Chae Chan Ping, has persisted despite a steady and
29 Chin, supra note 20, at 257 ("These decisions, and the statutes they upheld, are
inconsistent with fundamental values reflected in domestic constitutional law, yet they continue
to constitute the foundation of immigration law.").
30 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001).
31 Peter Spiro, How the Courts Could See Their Way to Striking down the Trump Travel
Ban, LAWFARE (Feb. 2, 2017, 1:48 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-courts-could-see-
their-way-striking-down-trump-travel-ban ("The courts have never imposed meaningful
constraints on the executive branch in th[e immigration] context.").
32 Chin, supra note 20, at 257.
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vigorous stream of scholarly criticism."33 In Chae Chan Ping, the Court
considered whether an 1882 law barring all future immigration of
Chinese laborers should work to exclude Chae Chan Ping, a Chinese
immigrant lawfully residing in the United States, who left in 1887 for
what he thought would be a brief visit to China.3< Although the 1882 law
contained a waiver provision designed to allow previously-admitted
Chinese laborers to leave and return, that provision was discontinued by
an act of Congress in 1888 while Chae Chan Ping was on his return
voyage to the United States.3 Upon arrival, he was denied entry.36
In a unanimous decision, the Court upheld the exclusion against a
constitutional equal protection challenge, finding that immigration
decisions by the legislative department to exclude aliens are conclusive
upon the judiciary.37 The propriety of immigration decisions and their
impact on foreign affairs with other countries "are not questions for
judicial determination. If there be any just ground of complaint on the
part of China, it must be made to the political department of our
government, which is alone competent to act upon the subject."38
Three years later, the Court largely rejected the claim that aliens
possessed any constitutional due process protections to appeal
immigration decisions.39 In affirming the propriety of an immigration
officer's summary denial of entry to a Japanese immigrant seeking to
reunite with her husband, the Court found that Congress may lawfully
make immigration officers "the sole and exclusive judge ... and no
other tribunal, unless expressly authorized by law to do so, is at liberty
33 Martin, supra note 16, at 29-30 ("Chae Chan Ping v. United States, also known as [tihe
Chinese Exclusion Case, is traditionally taken as the fountainhead of the plenary power
doctrine.").
34 See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 582 (1889).
35 Id.
36 Id. David A. Martin eloquently explains why so many "twenty-first-century observers"
are "deeply troubled" by this ruling:
The 1888 law it sustained stemmed from xenophobic and racist agitation in
California, scapegoating the Chinese in the midst of a severe economic recession.
And Chae Chan Ping himself is a highly sympathetic petitioner. He had lawfully
resided in the United States for fifteen years, journeying back to visit family in China
only after carefully obtaining the official certificate provided by law as the means for
his readmission. [And hie was already at sea on his return voyage when Congress
changed the law, with immediate effect, nullifying the use of those certificates to gain
reentry.
Martin, supra note 16, at 30-31 (pushing back on criticism: "[T]he case receives more blame
than it deserves.... The Court invoked sovereignty ... not to deny rights but instead primarily
to answer a federalism question.").
37 Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606.
38 Id. at 609.
39 See Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892).
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to reexamine or controvert the sufficiency of the evidence on which he
acted."40
The following year, the Court extended the plenary power doctrine
from exclusion of aliens not physically present on sovereign soil to
deportation of aliens in the United States. In Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, the Court upheld the deportation of a Chinese national purely on
nationality grounds, finding that, " [t]he power of [C]ongress . . . to
expel, like the power to exclude, aliens, or any specified class of aliens,
from the country, may be exercised entirely through executive
officers .... "41
"Unlike other bygone constitutional curiosities that offend our
contemporary sensibilities, [Chae Chan Ping] has never been
overturned."42 In fact, Chae Chan Ping and its progeny formed the
bedrock for a significant broadening of plenary power during the 1950s.
For example, in 1950, a German-born wife of a U.S. citizen challenged
her summary exclusion from entry at Ellis Island by an immigration
officer on national security grounds.43 In affirming the executive
branch's decision to exclude her without a hearing, the Court found
that,
[t]he action of the executive officer under such authority is final and
conclusive. Whatever the rule may be concerning deportation of
persons who have gained entry into the United States, it is not within
the province of any court, unless expressly authorized by law, to
review the determination of the political branch of the Government
to exclude a given alien.44
In 1952, three long-time residents of the United States were
ordered deported because of their former membership in the
4o Id. at 660 (citations omitted) ("It is not within the province of the judiciary to order that
foreigners who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or residence within the
United States, nor even been admitted into the country pursuant to law, shall be permitted to
enter, in opposition to the constitutional and lawful measures of the legislative and executive
branches of the national government. As to such persons, the decisions of executive or
administrative officers, acting within powers expressly conferred by congress, are due process of
law." (emphasis added)).
41 Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713-14 (1893).
42 Spiro, supra note 2 (summarizing over a century of precedent relying on Chae Chan Ping
to uphold noxious immigration laws, including a 2015 case denying due process protections to
an excludable immigrant).
43 See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
44 Id. at 543 (citations omitted). Two years after the ruling, Knauff found relief from the
political branches when newspaper editorials decried her exclusion and the Attorney General
granted her a hearing. Knauff lost before the Immigration Board of Special Inquiry but won a
reversal at the Board of Immigration Appeals, after which she became a lawful permanent
resident. See Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the
Lives of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 933, 955-64 (1995) (providing an
illuminating account of Knauffs journey before and after her Supreme Court case).
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Communist Party.45 Though noting the severity of deporting aliens who
had resided within the country for such a lengthy period of time, the
Court affirmed the deportations by finding that,
any policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with
contemporaneous policies in regard to the conduct of foreign
relations, the war power, and the maintenance of a republican form
of government. Such matters are so exclusively entrusted to the
political branches of government as to be largely immune from
judicial inquiry or interference.46
In 1953, the Court extended this reasoning in Shaughnessy v.
United States ex rel. Mezei, when it found that a noncitizen facing
exclusion was not entitled to any due process whatsoever, even if the
result was indefinite detention.47 After living in the United States for
more than twenty-five years, Ignatz Mezei attempted to return to his
native Romania to visit his dying mother but was denied entry into the
country.48 Upon his return to the United States, he was denied entry and
held at Ellis Island for over two years on national security grounds while
the government attempted and failed to find another country to host
him.49 The Court rejected his habeas claim that his indefinite detention
violated due process: "Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress
is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned."so
The Court reaffirmed the plenary power doctrine throughout the
1970s when it: upheld the exclusion of a self-described "revolutionary
Marxist"51; upheld a statute requiring a five-year period of admission as
a prerequisite for aliens wishing to receive medical care 52; and upheld a
45 See Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
46 Id. at 588-90 ("[Nlothing in the structure of our Government or the text of our
Constitution would warrant judicial review by standards which would require us to equate our
political judgment with that of Congress.").
47 345 U.S. 206 (1953).
48 Id. at 208; see also Weisselberg, supra note 44, at 964-65.
49 See Mezei, 345 U.S. at 208-10; see also Brian G. Slocum, The War on Terrorism and the
Extraterritorial Application of the Constitution in Immigration Law, 84 DENV. U. L. REv. 1017,
1024 (2007) ("Because Mezei could not establish his nationality, other nations would not take
him, and he remained confined by the government on Ellis Island.").
50 Mezei, 345 U.S. at 213. The Court reached this conclusion even though the "process"
afforded Mezei was no process at all. See Slocum, supra note 49, at 1024 ("Mezei was excluded
without a hearing based on confidential information. ... Despite the indefinite, and potentially
permanent, nature of his detention, the Court held that Mezei's due process rights were not
violated because Mezei was treated 'as if stopped at the border' and thus had no due process
rights." (emphasis in original)).
51 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) ("The Court without exception has
sustained Congress' 'plenary power to make rules for the admission of aliens and to exclude
those who possess those characteristics which Congress has forbidden.'" (citation omitted)).
52 See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976) ("For reasons long recognized as valid, the
responsibility for regulating the relationship between the United States and our alien visitors
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facially discriminatory provision of the Immigration Act that recognized
the relationship between children born out of wedlock with their
mothers but not their fathers.s> As recently as 2015, the Court upheld
the exclusion of a permanent resident's spouse on unspecified national
security grounds based on secret evidence never made public.54
In short, the Supreme Court has never "struck down an
immigration classification, even ones based on race."ss With such a
consistent history of deference, it is easy for one to assume that "[t]he
court has given the political branches the judicial equivalent of a blank
check to regulate immigration as they see fit."6 W'hile "[t]he courts have
justified this constitutional exceptionalism on the grounds that
immigration law implicates foreign relations and national security," it
nonetheless has upheld discriminatory decisions "even in the absence of
a specific, plausible foreign policy rationale."57
Given this uniform history of deference in the immigration
context, it is little wonder many Court observers and commentators
believe the plenary power to be absolute. Notably, the Trump
Administration has advanced this absolutist position in its defense of
the Executive Orders, asserting that courts cannot review the President's
Executive Orders precisely because there is "no basis for the Judiciary to
second-guess the President's determinations" in the immigration
context.58 While this position appears to rest on firm legal footing, both
Judge Robart and a unified panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
has been committed to the political branches of the Federal Government. Since decisions in
these matters may implicate our relations with foreign powers ... such decisions are frequently
of a character more appropriate to either the Legislature or the Executive than to the
Judiciary.").
53 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977); see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420 (1998);
cf Chin, supra note 20, at 272 (critiquing the view that these cases turned on the plenary power
doctrine, because "unmarried fathers are in a class by themselves; differential treatment of this
group is probably the sex classification which the Court has been most willing to find
reasonable domestically").
54 See Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2131 (2015) (recasting petitioner's claim as a
"depriv[ation] of her constitutional right to live in the United States with her spouse," for
which "[t]here is no such constitutional right," instead of focusing on her procedural
constitutional right to due process of law).
55 Spiro, supra note 2.
56 Id.
57 Id. (questioning what possible national security interests could be promoted by denying a
father from reuniting with his out-of-wediock son from the French West Indies).
58 Defendants' Opposition to TRO, supra note 27, at 22-24 (asserting that immigration
decisions are areas "within the exclusive domain of the political branches of government... . It
is thus well-established that courts cannot evaluate the President's national security and foreign
affairs judgments, especially in the immigration context.... It is simply not possible for the
Court here to evaluate the President's Executive Order without passing judgment on the
President's national security and foreign affairs determinations").
2018]1 1135
CARDOZO LAW REVIEW
rejected the notion of absolute judicial deference.59 Thus, some outer
limits to plenary power must exist. Sections I.B and I.C explore those
possible limits in more detail.
B. The Myth of the Myth of Plenary Power
Despite the long and seemingly conclusive historical record for a
plenary power doctrine, some contend that no such doctrine exists at all
and that the Court's treatment of immigration policies is no more
exceptional than its treatment of domestic laws.60 For example, three
days after entry of the first Executive Order, Professor Adam Cox
challenged the so-called "myth of unconstrained immigration power" in
declaring that the "Muslim [b]an is [l]ikely to be [h]eld
[u]nconstitutional."61 Cox observed that "many have wondered whether
the order, even if its [sic] amounts to such a discriminatory policy, is
immune from attack because it is an immigration policy" and thus
"constitutionally permissible" under "the doctrine of 'immigration
plenary power."'62 According to Cox, however, the assumption that
"[t]he so-called plenary power... spell[s] death for any constitutional
claim brought by immigrants seeking admission ... is simply wrong.
The plenary power doctrine is more of a rhetorical trope than a
coherent judicial doctrine."63
The claim that plenary power is more myth than reality asserts that
each of the seminal constitutional immigration law cases "was decided
during a constitutional era when such policies were often accepted as a
matter of domestic law as well."64 Rather than representing a sovereign
exception to the reach of the Constitution, these so-called plenary power
59 See Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151, 1161 (9th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) ("[Tihe
Government has taken the position that the President's decisions about immigration
policy... are unreviewable, even if those actions potentially contravene constitutional rights
and protections. The Government indeed asserts that it violates separation of powers for the
judiciary to entertain a constitutional challenge to executive actions such as this one. There is
no precedent to support this claimed unreviewability, which runs contrary to the fundamental
structure of our constitutional democracy." (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765
(2008))).
60 See, e.g., Chin, supra note 20, at 257; cf Matthew J. Lindsay, Disaggregating "Immigration
Law", 68 FLA. L. REv. 179, 219 (2016) (recognizing the "constitutional exceptionalism of the
federal immigration power" but advancing the claim that such exceptionalism is slowly
eroding).
61 Cox, supra note 18 ("The plenary power does not stand for the proposition that
blatant... discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, or ideology is constitutionally
permissible in immigration policy.").
62 Id. (quoting Spiro, supra note 31).
63 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
64 Id.
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cases were in fact consistent with the contemporary interpretation of the
Constitution. This reinterpretation of the plenary power cases was first
introduced by Jack Chin in 1999, when he observed that
the Court's treatment of substantive immigration
classifications... may not be that different from how it has treated
those groups domestically .... At the time they were decided, many
of the terrible immigration cases could have come out the same way
even if they involved the rights of citizens under domestic
constitutional law. 65
This theory has intuitive historical appeal, and of course also
provides a sliver of hope to the troves of progressive scholars decrying
the plenary power doctrine. 66 It allows one to square the 1867 passage of
the Fourteenth Amendment, guaranteeing equal protection under the
laws, with the fact that, "[b]y statute, the right to immigrate was tied to
race between 1882 and 1965."67 By placing these cases in historical
context, so the theory goes, constitutional immigration law seems no
more exceptional than contemporary domestic constitutional law.68
While this theory of the myth of plenary power is appealing, it
relies on a tortured reading of precedent. Had Chae Chan Ping and its
progeny been decided on the basis that the challenged exclusionary
classifications were substantively permissible, the decisions surely would
have said so. But they did not. Instead, these cases universally reasoned
that the challenged immigration policies were immune from
constitutional challenge and judicial review, not that they withstood
65 Chin, supra note 20, at 257-58 (asserting that "the Court has rarely, if ever, tested
discrimination against a group in the immigration context at a moment when it had already
recognized that the Constitution prohibited discrimination on that ground against citizens").
66 See Martin, supra note 16, at 30 (observing that "the doctrine ha[s] been widely and
persistently condemned in the scholarly literature. It almost seems an obligatory rite of passage
for scholars embarking on the study of immigration law to provide their own critique of
plenary power or related doctrines of deference").
67 Chin, supra note 20, at 261; see also Lindsay, supra note 60, at 180-81, 180 nl (noting
that "Congress abandoned the limitation of eligibility for naturalization to 'free white
persons'... in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA) .... Yet it was not until the
Immigration Act of 1965 that the civil rights revolution finally came to immigration law");
Spiro, supra note 2.
68 Cox, supra note 18 ("Chae Chan Ping was decided seven years before Plessy v. Ferguson,
which upheld Jim Crow segregation and birthed the infamous jurisprudential principle of
'separate but equal.' Harisiades was decided in 1952, a period when First Amendment
protections were much more watered down-and when communist party members were not
infrequently criminally prosecuted. And Fiallo was handed down in the mid-1970's, during the
nascent phase of the Court's sex equality jurisprudence, when a number of domestic laws that
discriminated on the basis of sex were upheld by the Supreme Court."); see also Chin, supra
note 20, at 260 ("[Alfter enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment but before 1889, the year
Chae Chan Ping was decided, state and federal courts upheld racial segregation in schools,
miscegenation laws, exclusion of witnesses on the basis of race, and laws granting benefits to
whites but not to blacks.").
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constitutional challenge after judicial review.69 Indeed, this theory that
constitutional immigration jurisprudence remains consistent with
constitutional domestic jurisprudence is directly contradicted by the
Court's clear pronouncement in Fiallo v. Bell that, "in the exercise of its
broad power over immigration and naturalization, 'Congress regularly
makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens."'70
Chin acknowledges that "[t]he plenary power cases use strong
language in support of the idea that Congress can do what it wants," but
opines that "they may be largely dicta."71 While Chin may be right that
the most full-throated defenses of sovereign plenary power are not
directly tied to the holdings in many of these cases, these consistent
declarations, combined with the fact that "[t]he Supreme Court has
never struck down a provision of the immigration law
outright ... stretching back more than a century, adds up to the plenary
power doctrine."72
C. "Contemporary Constitutional Norms": The Limits of Plenary
Power
While the Court has consistently reaffirmed the existence of
plenary power, "recent developments in constitutional immigration law
have begun to chart a course toward ... the encroachment of
mainstream constitutional norms" into the analysis.73 Only two years
after Chin's reinterpretation of the plenary power cases, the Court
provided a striking example of how "mainstream constitutional norms
have infiltrated the Court's immigration opinions."74
In Zadvydas v. Davis, the Court held that the government lacked
statutory authority to detain indefinitely Kestutis Zadvydas, a resident
noncitizen subject to a final order of removal, and ordered Zadvydas
69 See generally supra Section I.A.
70 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976));
see also Spiro, supra note 31 ("The 1977 decision in Fiallo v. Bell-well into the modern-era
rights revolution-is particularly instructive. The case involved a facially discriminatory
provision of the Immigration Act that recognized the relationship between children born out of
wedlock with their mothers but not their fathers. The regime implicated a double-barreled
discrimination for equal protection purposes, implicating the suspect classes of gender and
legitimacy. The Court upheld the provision on the basis of exactly the kids of stereotypes that
trigger close judicial scrutiny in any other context.").
71 Chin, supra note 20, at 259 ("Deference to discriminatory immigration classifications
when domestic constitutional law would permit such discrimination against citizens does not
imply deference when there is a domestic rule against discrimination on that basis.").
72 Spiro, supra note 31.
73 Lindsay, supra note 60, at 224-25.
74 Id. at 225-35 (analyzing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)).
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released from federal custody and paroled into the United States.75 The
issue involved a statute providing that aliens set for deportation could
not be held in detention for longer than ninety days unless the Attorney
General determined the individuals "to be a risk to the community," in
which case the aliens "may be detained beyond the removal period."76
Immigration officials could not find a country willing to receive two
deportable aliens within the ninety-day period but continued to hold the
aliens in detention pursuant to the statutory exception.77 Rather than
directly confronting the constitutionality of the statute itself, the
majority reviewed the legislative intent of the statute and held that it
could not find "any clear indication of congressional intent to grant the
Attorney General the power to hold indefinitely in confinement an alien
ordered removed," which would constitute a violation of due process.78
The Court ultimately found that the dictates of constitutional due
process required that, after a period of six months' detention, the
government provide evidence that further detention was necessary.79
Thus, while the Court rested its holding on statutory
interpretation, it nonetheless injected constitutional due process
considerations into the analysis to circumscribe an executive branch
immigration action.80 The Court observed the "'cardinal principle' of
statutory interpretation, however, that when an Act of Congress raises 'a
serious doubt' as to its constitutionality, 'this Court will first ascertain
whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the
question may be avoided."'81 Even as the majority acknowledged that
Zadvydas lacked a legal right to live at large in the United States and
affirmed Congress's plenary power over the removal of noncitizens, it
nevertheless insisted that such power was "subject to important
constitutional limitations."82 In a dramatic change in tone from the
75 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684-85, 702.
76 Id. at 682.
77 Id. at 684-87.
78 Id. at 696-97; see also Lindsay, supra note 60, at 227-29 ("By the Court's own
admission ... the plenary power doctrine prevented Zadvydas from challenging the statute
directly on Fifth Amendment grounds .... [But a] five-Justice majority 'construe[d] the statute
to contain an implicit 'reasonable time' limitation, the application of which is subject to federal-
court review.'" (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682)).
79 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
so See Lindsay, supra note 60, at 228, 231 ("Given that Zadvydas was, at bottom, a case
about statutory construction, one might have expected the Court's analysis to center on the text
and perhaps the legislative history of the relevant provision. But it did not.... Justice Stephen
Breyer devoted eight pages of his twenty-one-page majority opinion to the 'obvious'
constitutional difficulty 'arising out of a statute that .. . permits an indefinite, perhaps
permanent, deprivation of human liberty without any [judicial] protection."' (quoting
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 692)).
81 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689 (quoting Cromwell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
82 Id. at 690, 693 ("Freedom from imprisonment-from government custody, detention, or
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complete deference of early immigration decisions, the Court noted
merely the "greater immigration-related expertise of the Executive
Branch" and that "principles of judicial review in this area recognize
primary Executive Branch responsibility."83 Far from a complete
abdication of its judicial review role, the Court claimed instead that it
would "listen with care" to the concerns of the Executive when
reviewing the constitutionality of immigration policies.84
But while the language and holding in Zadvydas illustrate that the
plenary power of the political branches to enact immigration policy does
have constitutional limits, it remains unclear what those limits are or
whether the Executive Order or its subsequent extreme vetting
iterations will breach those limits. After all, despite a smattering of
decisions siding with deportable or excludable aliens on statutory
interpretation grounds, the fact remains that "[t]he courts have never
imposed meaningful constraints on the executive branch in [the
immigration] context."85 But "[t]hat does not mean they couldn't or that
they won't here." 86
Constitutional history and context may help provide the answers.
While a theory that plenary power simply does not exist goes too far, the
history underlying such a theory may yet help inform when an
immigration order runs far afoul of a contemporary constitutional
norm. As Chin persuasively asserts, it is at best a close question whether
race-based or religious-based classifications in the nineteenth century;
sexual orientation-based classifications in the early twentieth century; or
gender-based classifications in the 1970s offended the contemporary
moral and constitutional norms of the day.87 Indeed, the historical and
jurisprudential record strongly suggests they did not.
But what if a future discrimination immigration policy does
"violate[] contemporary constitutional norms?"88 Perhaps, "if a case
arises which challenges discrimination on a ground that violates
other forms of physical restraint-lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Fifth Amendment Due
Process] Clause protects.").
83 Id. at 700 (emphasis added).
84 Id.; see also Lindsay, supra note 60, at 229 (Justice Breyer "discount[ed] the relevance of
the usual rationales for buffering federal immigration regulations against constitutional review.
The case did not involve 'terrorism or other special circumstances,' he reasoned, 'where special
arguments' grounded in national security might justify 'preventive detention
and ... heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches."' (quoting Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 696)).
85 Spiro, supra note 31.
86 Id.; see also Lindsay, supra note 60, at 225 (claiming that "the encroachment of
mainstream constitutional norms" may be removing the "exceptional" label from constitutional
immigration law).
87 See Chin, supra note 20, at 259-64.
88 Id. at 259.
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contemporary constitutional norms, the Court will be faced with a new
situation."89 Chin called these the "easy, unlikely cases"9o:
The best test of the plenary power doctrine would involve a statute
discriminating on a basis which domestic law clearly forbids. If
persons of African ancestry or Jewish religion or Democratic Party
membership were made ineligible for immigration or
naturalization... the Court would overwhelmingly vote to strike it
down. Yet, it is not likely that we will see such a case. It is conceivable
that Congress will cut immigration drastically, but it is extremely
difficult to imagine in 1999 that any future Congress would pass, and
a president would sign, anything like the National Origins Quota
System or Chinese Exclusion Act. If the unlikely happened, such laws
would probably be invalidated.91
If the Executive Orders serve as prologue for the next four years,
the Supreme Court may soon face one of these easy, unlikely cases.
D. Extreme Vetting: Have We Reached Plenary Power's Limits?
While President Trump's policy positions can be difficult to define
with any precision, his anti-Muslim campaign rhetoric, refusal to
disavow his proposal for a Muslim ban, and the language and stated
intent of the Executive Orders strongly suggest that extreme vetting may
be little more than a proxy for religious discrimination. Domestic
religious-based discrimination, while constitutionally permissible in the
nineteenth century, is clearly forbidden in any conception of twenty-
first century constitutional norms. 92 The same may be true for the types
of nationality-based discrimination and due process limitations
89 Id. at 259. Indeed, the recent "encroachment of mainstream constitutional norms" in
immigration jurisprudence may have less to do with a substantive shift by the Court than a
recognition of the societal shift in what may generally be considered in modern American life
to be a fundamental constitutional norm. Lindsay, supra note 60, at 225-26.
90 Chin, supra note 20, at 285.
91 Id. Some constitutional imnmigration scholars resist the notion that "[t]he transition to a
constitutionally unexceptional immigration power is unlikely to be accomplished all at once in
a dramatic act of judicial overturning." Lindsay, supra note 60, at 259. But this contention
presupposes a continuation of the sorts of traditional immigration cases coming before the
Court. Just as few could or did predict the political rise of Donald Trump, few could or did
predict the unlikely case of an immigration order in 2017 based on all-but explicit religious
discrimination.
92 See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 728 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(emphasizing the centrality of the constitutional prohibition against religious discrimination:
"Just as the government may not segregate people on account of their race, so too it may not
segregate on the basis of religion"); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (holding that
the "clearest command" of the Establishment Clause is that the government may not engage in
"denominational preferentialism").
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contemplated by extreme vetting measures, though these are closer
questions.93 What appears uncontroversial, however, is the notion that
contemporary constitutional norms prohibit, at a minimum, invidious,
intentional discrimination on the basis of religion. In this sense, the
President may very well provide the Court "with a strong case to test"
the limits of the plenary power doctrine.
Consider, for purposes of a case study on the limits of plenary
power, the language, effect, and intent of the First Executive Order.
Section 3(c) of the Order imposed a temporary ban on the entry of
immigrants and non-immigrants from seven Muslim-majority nations:
Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Syria, Sudan, and Yemen.94 While facially
religiously-neutral, the overwhelming evidence points to a
discriminatory motive by the Administration to exclude at least some
subset of Muslims from the country on the basis of their religious
affiliation. In addition to the President's consistent campaign promises
to implement a Muslim ban and to "certainly implement" a Muslim
registry in the United States,95 Trump surrogate Rudy Giuliani
confirmed to Fox News the day after the Order was signed that Trump
wanted to find a "legal" way to ban Muslims from the United States.96
93 See Shawn E. Fields, The Unreviewable Executive? National Security and the Limits of
Plenary Power, 84 TENN. L. REV. 731, 774-75 (2017) ("Immigration law and policy is in many
ways defined by nationality-based discrimination that would be constitutionally unsupportable
in a purely domestic context. The wholesale adoption of substantive constitutional rights
jurisprudence in the immigration arena, while arguably justified in non-national security cases,
would require, at a minimum, a radical rethinking of the entire field of immigration law."
(internal quotations omitted)); Michael Kagan, Is the Chinese Exclusion Case Still Good Law?
(The President Is Trying to Find Out), 1 NEV. L.J. F. 80, 87 (2017) ("Since the passage of the
Chinese Exclusion Act there has never been a time when the United States had an immigration
policy based entirely on individualized criteria, with country of citizenship playing no role.").
94 See Executive Order, supra note 4, at 8977 ("To temporarily reduce investigative
burdens on relevant agencies ... I hereby proclaim that the immigrant and nonimmigrant
entry into the United States of aliens from countries referred to in section 217(a)(12) of the
INA, 8 U.S.C. 1187(a)(12), would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, and I
hereby suspend entry into the United States, as immigrants and nonimmigrants, of such
persons for 90 days from the date of this order. . . .").
95 See Alana Abramson, What Trump Has Said About a Muslim Registry, ABC NEWS (Nov.
18, 2016, 7:00 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/trump-muslim-registry/story?id=43639946
(documenting then-candidate Trump's numerous statements about a possible Muslim tracking
system, including his answer to the question "is there going to be a database that tracks the
Muslims here in this country?" To which he responded, "[o]h I would certainly implement that
Absolutely."); see also Johnson, supra note 1.
96 See Amy B. Wang, Trump Asked for a 'Muslim Ban,' Giuliani Says-and Ordered a
Commission to Do It 'Legally', WASH. POST (Jan. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/the-fix/wp/2017/01/29/trump-asked-for-a-muslim-ban-giuliani-says-and-ordered-a-
commission-to-do-it-legally/?utmterm=.93ab42422ef7 ("So when [Trump] first announced it,
he said, 'Muslim ban.' He called me up. He said, 'Put a commission together. Show me the right
way to do it legally.'" (Rudy W. Giuliani quoting President Trump)); see also Faiza Patel, Yates
Letter Points to Evidence Showing Executive Order Unconstitutional, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 31,
2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/37053/yates-letter-points-evidence-showing-executive-
1142
FROM GUANTANAMO TO SYRIA
Moreover, when signing the Executive Order, Trump read out its title
"Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United
States," looked up and said "[w]e all know what [it] means ... .. 97 These
admissions "close in time" to the signing of the Executive Order square
with then-candidate Trump's explicit admission in a July 2016 interview
on Meet the Press that he would revamp his extreme vetting proposals
to target Muslims without expressly saying so. 98
Within this context, it makes more sense why President Trump
took the extraordinary step of providing a draft of the Executive Order
to the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) only hours before it was signed
into law and charged the OLC with the narrow task of ensuring that the
order was "lawful on its face and properly drafted."99 The OLC did not
take into "account... statements made by an administration or it[s]
surrogates close in time to the issuance of an Executive Order that may
bear on the order's purpose." 100
The Executive Order also explicitly stated, in Section 5(b), that the
U.S. government would grant priority status to refugees from these
seven countries who were persecuted on the basis of their religion, so
long as that religion was a minority in one of the seven countries.'o0 This
provision obviously excludes Muslim refugees from these seven
Muslim-majority nations. Lest there be any confusion about the intent
behind this provision, Trump told the Christian Broadcasting Network
hours before signing the Executive Order that the purpose of the order
was to prioritize Christian refugees over Muslims who had been
"horribly treated" in these countries. 102
order-unconstitutional (Giuliani then noted that his commission "came up with the idea of
focusing on danger rather than religion; [that] the ban was based 'on places where there are
substantial evidence that people are sending terrorists into our country.' Of course, as many
have pointed out, the countries affected by the ban have hardly been a source of terrorist
attacks in the United States.").
97 Patel, supra note 96 (And for what it's worth, the son of then-National Security Advisor
Michael Flynn praised the Executive Order the day after it was signed by tweeting:
"#MuslimBan.").
98 Id. When NBC's Chuck Todd asked if Trump was retreating from his Muslim ban
proposal, Trump responded that he was actually expanding on that proposal but lamented that
he could no longer be explicit about the intent of the proposal: "I actually don't think it's a
rollback. In fact, you could say it's an expansion .... People were so upset when I used the
word Muslim. Oh, you can't use the word Muslim. Remember this. And I'm OK with that,
because I'm talking territory instead of Muslim." Diamond, supra note 3.
99 Patel, supra note 96.
100 Id. (quoting Acting Attorney General Sally Yates).
101 See Executive Order, supra note 4, § 5(b) ("Upon the resumption of USRAP admissions,
the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Homeland Security, is further
directed to make changes, to the extent permitted by law, to prioritize refugee claims made
by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution, provided that the religion of the
individual is a minority religion in the individual's country of nationality.").
102 Daniel Burke, Trump Says US Will Prioritize Christian Refugees, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017,
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These two provisions of the Executive Order, combined with
contemporaneous evidence of the Order's intent, appear to represent
textbook government preference for one religion over another. Indeed,
even assuming against all evidence that the seven-nation ban has a
religiously-neutral intent and effect, the provision "prioritizling] refugee
claims made by individuals on the basis of religious-based persecution,
provided that the religion of the individual is a minority religion in the
individual's country of nationality" itself violates the Establishment
Clause for singling out minority faiths generally for favorable
treatment.1 0 3 In Board of Education v. Grumet, Justice Kennedy, in his
concurring opinion, emphatically declared that
[w]hether or not the purpose is accommodation and whether or not
the government provides similar gerrymanders to people of all
religious faiths, the Establishment Clause forbids the government to
use religion as a line-drawing criterion. In this respect, the
Establishment Clause mirrors the Equal Protection Clause. Just as the
government may not segregate people on account of their race, so
too it may not segregate on the basis of religion.1 04
It appears, then, that the Executive Order likely violated the
clearest of contemporary constitutional norms-the prohibition against
government establishment of religion. This "clearest command" not
only mirrors the now-inarguable prohibition against race-based
segregation, but has been so viewed since at least 1885, when Justice
Field declared that any law supporting an established religion would
automatically be void as violative of the Constitution's most
fundamental norms. 05 One may at least plausibly argue, therefore, that
the Executive Order may have been invalidated on the merits of a
constitutional challenge, notwithstanding its singular purpose as a
political branch form of immigration control.
In addition to First Amendment constitutional challenges, several
lawsuits claimed the Executive Order violated the Fifth Amendment's
equal protection and due process protections for impermissibly singling
out aliens from seven specified nations in a "patently arbitrary
classification, utterly lacking in rational justification."06 One argument
11:28 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/27/politics/trump-christian-refugees.
103 Executive Order, supra note 4, § 5(b); see Nelson Tebbe et al., How Trump's Executive
Order on Immigration Violates Religious Freedom Laws, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 31, 2017), https://
www.justsecurity.org/37061/trumps-executive-order-immigration-violates-religious-freedom-
laws ("That language expressly singles out minority faiths for favorable treatment.").
104 Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 728 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
105 See Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546 (1885).
106 Marty Lederman, Getting a Handle on the Litigation Challenging the Seven-Nation
"Travel Ban," JUST SECURITY (Feb. 6, 2017, 6:00 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/37315/
getting-handle-litigation-challenging-seven-nation-travel-ban (observing that lawsuits
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advanced by these litigants is that no significant terrorist attacks have
been committed by nationals of the seven banned countries, whereas
fifteen of the nineteen 9/11 hijackers hailed from Saudi Arabia, a
country not covered by the Executive Order.107 But it is indisputable that
the previous administration had singled out these seven countries as
"countries of concern" for future terrorist attacks, and it would seem
unwise for the judiciary to second-guess the predictive capabilities of the
political branches' national security apparatus based solely on past
events.108 For purposes of this discussion, it suffices to note that these
constitutional challenges present much closer questions than the
Establishment Clause challenges, and thus may not sufficiently offend
contemporary constitutional norms to defeat plenary power reasoning
in the immigration context, even if the order might otherwise fail in the
domestic context.109
Two further points require clarification at this stage. First, one may
argue that this entire discussion will be rendered moot if and when the
Supreme Court weighs in on the merits of the Second Executive Order.
Not so. Unless Trump abandons entirely his doctrine of extreme vetting
for incoming immigrants and refugees-an unlikely proposition-one
may reasonably assume that future iterations of this doctrine will
surface in one form or another, raising similar constitutionally-
troubling issues. Indeed, even if the administration becomes more astute
at concealing its discriminatory motives, one wonders whether Trump
will ever outrun his inflammatory and incendiary rhetoric underlying
his entire immigration platform.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, constitutional challenges
to immigration policies are not limited to broad facial challenges to an
challenging the rational basis for singling out aliens from the seven specified nations, in
violation of the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment, are in fact articulating a
"patently arbitrary classification" standard); see Plaintiffs Motion for TRO, supra note 8, at 9-
11 (arguing that, "[e]ven under rational basis review, the Executive Order fails").
107 See, e.g., Plaintiffs Motion for TRO, supra note 8, at 9; see also Uri Friedman, Where
America's Terrorists Actually Come From, ATLANTIC (Jan. 30, 2017), https://
www.theatlantic.com/internationallarchive/2017/01/trump-immigration-ban-terrorism/
514361.
10 Kyle Blaine & Julia Horowitz, How the Trump administration Chose the 7 Countries in
the Immigration Executive Order, CNN (Jan. 30, 2017, 1:52 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/
01 /29/politics/how-the-trump-administration-chose-the-7-countries/index.html ("The seven
Muslim-majority countries targeted in President Trump's executive order on immigration were
initially identified as 'countries of concern' under the Obama administration.").
109 A much stronger argument for litigants challenging the Executive Order on nationality
grounds stems from a statutory violation of the INA, which prohibits facially discriminatory
classifications based on nationality. See 8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(1)(A) (2012) ("[N]o person shall
receive any preference or priority or be discriminated against in the issuance of an immigrant
visa because of the person's race, sex, nationality, place of birth, or place of residence."); cf
Defendants' Opposition to TRO, supra note 27, at 19-21.
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immigration law such as the Executive Order. Such challenges often can,
and are, brought by individuals or entities within the United States,
rendering moot any discussion of extraterritorial constitutional
applicability. Instead, most immigration challenges arise from the
decisions by individual immigration officials to deny entry to individual
immigrants or refugees residing abroad. Given the history, rhetoric, and
stated policy positions of this Administration, it seems highly likely that
extraterritorial noncitizens will seek to challenge adverse immigration
decisions on constitutional grounds, particularly if those noncitizens are
Muslim or hail from a part of the world traditionally in the President's
crosshairs. The question then becomes: can these extraterritorial
noncitizens assert such constitutional challenges? The balance of this
Article considers that question.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
To determine whether an immigrant residing abroad may assert
constitutional protections to challenge an immigration policy or
decision, one must first examine the uneven history of extraterritorial
constitutional jurisprudence more generally. "The question of whether
and to what extent the Constitution applies to U.S. government action
abroad has historically oscillated between several broad, competing
perspectives."o11 The first is "a universalist theory of the Constitution, in
which any U.S. government... is subject to all the limits imposed by the
Constitution," whenever and wherever it acts."' Adherents of this
position claim alternately that the Constitution limits the power of the
government at home and abroad or that the Constitution protects
fundamental individual rights that cannot be "switched off' at the
border.112
The second perspective views the Constitution "as reflecting a
social compact between the government and the people," requiring a
level of engagement between the two for constitutional protections to
apply.113 Like the universalist theory, social compact theorists have
110 Jules Lobel, Fundamental Norms, International Law, and the Extraterritorial
Constitution, 36 YALE J. INT'L L. 307, 312 (2011).
111 Id. at 314.
112 Id. at 314-15 ("While the universalist position has adherents in the academy, it finds little
judicial support." Echoing the concerns underpinning the plenary power doctrine, "the
mainstream judicial hostility to this approach is premised on the practical fear of overly
constraining the political branches' ability to conduct U.S. foreign policy."); see Boumediene v.
Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (rejecting the notion that "the political branches have the power
to switch the Constitution on or off at will").
113 Lobel, supra note 110, at 312; see Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and
Constitutional Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 2073, 2075-76 (2005) ("In
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articulated the social compact theory in one of two ways: either from a
strict territorial perspective,114 or by examining the noncitizen's
"significant voluntary connection" with the United States.15 Regardless
of the approach, the social compact theory of extraterritoriality remains
a restrictive one.
Finding a middle ground between these two extreme normative
positions, a bare majority of the Court in Boumediene v. Bush adopted
what has become known as the "functional approach" to extraterritorial
constitutional applicability.116 Rather than adopting a bright-line
normative approach to extraterritoriality, the functional approach
considers whether extending a particular constitutional provision to a
particular individual in a particular circumstance would be
"impracticable and anomalous."117 This consequentialist approach
provides judicial flexibility to extend the Constitution on a case-by-case
basis only "where it would be most needed,"11s but its imprecision and
malleability has created confusion and contradictory results at the lower
courts in the nine years since Boumediene was decided.119 This emphasis
on practical considerations divorced from a firm theoretical grounding
has led many courts to ignore the fundamental premise of the Court's
opinion, leading at least one scholar to conclude that lower courts have
"effectively overruled" Boumediene.120
This Section outlines the century-old evolution of extraterritorial
jurisprudence from each constitutional perspective: the broad
universalist, the narrow social contract, and the practical functionalist.
By reviewing the circumstances and reasoning of these disparate strands
of extraterritorial thought, it should become clear that no one
perspective has yet won the day, which helps explain the ongoing
confusion over the doctrine of extraterritoriality.
this model, U.S. citizens have extraterritorial constitutional rights and foreign nationals do
not.").
114 See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891) (holding that "the Constitution can have no
operation in another country").
115 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (plurality opinion).
116 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764; see also Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial
Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 82 S. CAL. L. REv. 259, 261 (2009) (elucidating the
"functional approach" adopted by Justice Kennedy in Boumediene).
117 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 759 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74-75 (1957) (Harlan,
J., concurring)).
118 Id. at 759.
119 See Neuman, supra note 28, at 1465-67 (discussing the uneven application of the
functional test among lower courts).
120 See Alexander, supra note 26.
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A. A Global Constitution?: The Universalist Theory
The question of whether the Constitution extends past the borders
of the United States is not a novel issue. At the beginning of the
twentieth century, the Court faced the question of whether full
constitutional rights extended to newly acquired territories in the
Insular Cases.121Though the Court splintered along ideological and
pragmatic lines, a universalist theory emerged among a plurality of
Justices urging far broader extraterritorial application of the
Constitution than at any previous time.122
Within this universalist camp, two prevailing claims emerged, one
structural and one rights-based.123 The structural claim asserts the
Constitution should apply extraterritorially to restrain government
conduct and to maintain the separation of powers. 124 The rights-based
claim is premised on the notion that certain constitutional rights are so
fundamental to the concept of liberty that their import cannot stop at
the border, but must be available to everyone everywhere regardless of
nationality or location.
Structurally, the Court recognized that Congress had the power "to
make laws for the government of territories, without being subject to all
the restrictions which are imposed upon that body when passing laws
121 The Insular Cases refer to a series of cases addressing America's imperial maneuvers in
the early twentieth century, and scholars disagree over precisely which cases are legitimate
constituents of the Insular Cases. This Article references the most important of the Insular
Cases, Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), and the progeny of Downes that most directly
addressed the issue of extraterritorial constitutional applicability. For a more general discussion
of the Insular Cases, see generally JAMES EDWARD KERR, THE INSULAR CASES: THE ROLE OF THE
JUDICIARY IN AMERICAN EXPANSIONISM (1982); JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT
AND PUERTO RICO: THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL (1985); see also Christina Duffy
Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV.
973, 982-83 (2009) (providing insightful background on the history of the Insular Cases).
122 See Burnett, supra note 121, at 984 (endorsing the Boumediene reinterpretation of the
Insular Cases that "the Constitution has independent force in these territories, a force not
contingent upon acts of legislative grace," thus suggesting a universality to the Constitution).
123 See Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush,
110 COLUM. L. REv. 537, 548-50 (2010) (describing the dual nature of the Suspension Clause as
both a structural limitation and individual right, as conceived by Justice Kennedy and in the
cases upon which he relied); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 914-
20 (1991) (describing various theories of extraterritorial constitutionality); Lobel, supra note 25,
at 1651 (examining why universalist "limitations stemming from separation of powers are
treated differently from limitations based on provisions of the Bill of Rights").
124 This framework discusses extraterritoriality not as rights to be asserted by aliens abroad,
but as limits on the power of the executive and legislative branches of the federal government.
See Lobel, supra note 25, at 1653 ("Moreover, by focusing on the power of a branch to act,
structural restraints relocate the inquiry away from who is being harmed and where that person
suffers the harm, and instead to whether the actor has exceeded its power and jurisdiction to so
act. The status of the person harmed thus ought to play no role in the inquiry.").
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for the United States" itself.125 However, the Court also observed that
Congress's law-making power was not without limits, and that the
Constitution applied to these territories to the extent that its provisions
operated as a limitation on governmental power. 126 Thus, "the real issue
in the Insular Cases was not whether the Constitution extended to the
Philippines or [to] Puerto Rico when [the United States] went there, but
[rather] which ... of its provisions were applicable by way of [a]
limitation upon the exercise of executive and legislative power . . "127
From a fundamental rights perspective, the cases recognized that
certain fundamental rights must be extended as an effective limit on
legislative and executive power, even where that power is exercised
thousands of miles from the United States.128 To do otherwise is to
create a place where the political branches of government may act
without legal constraint.129 Unlike the structural restraint approach,
however, the rights-based approach did not purport to apply every
constitutional provision, but only those provisions deemed fundamental
in a historical or natural law sense. 130 As Justice Brown opined in
Downes v. Bidwell, there "is a clear distinction between such
prohibitions as go to the very root of the power of Congress to act at all,
irrespective of time or place, and such as are operative only throughout
the United States or among the several states."131 For Brown, while the
Constitution did not apply to unincorporated territories, Congress was
nevertheless bound by certain fundamental or natural rights, which
125 Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 142 (1904).
126 Id.; see also Gerald L. Neuman, Understanding Global Due Process, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
365, 366 (2009) ("The Insular Cases also stand for another important principle, that the
Constitution as such applies to the U.S. government wherever it acts. The Constitution is the
source of federal power, and in that sense it applies everywhere, although particular
constitutional provisions may have more limited geographic scope, just as they may have
limited substantive or personal scope. In some cases the geographic limitations are explicit, but
in other cases they are implied.").
127 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922); see also United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936) (finding that, even when examining the "plenary and
exclusive power of the President" in the field of foreign relations, that power is "subordinat[e]
to the applicable provisions of the Constitution").
128 See, e.g., Dorr, 195 U.S. at 146-47 (relying on the distinction between fundamental and
non-fundamental rights to reject extending the right to a jury trial to the colonized people);
Lobel, supra note 25, at 1667-68 ("The Court held in Dorr that the right to a jury trial was not
fundamental, but repeated Justice White's formulation that inherent principles that are the
basis of all free government constitutionally limited U.S. actions in the territories."); Neuman,
supra note 126, at 367 (observing that the Insular Cases distinguished between "fundamental"
and "non-fundamental" constitutional rights, finding that only the former "followed the flag").
129 See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008).
130 See Lobel, supra note 110, at 325 ("The Insular Cases most clearly reflect the older,
fundamental rights jurisprudence.... [T]he Court... distinguished between those principles
that were fundamental and those that were not. The former category of prohibitions would
apply wherever the United States exercised authority.").
131 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 277 (1901) (internal quotations omitted).
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apply "by inference and the general spirit of the
Constitution... [rather] than by any express and direct application of
its provisions."132
In 1957, Justice Hugo Black voiced strong support for the
universalist theory in a plurality opinion in Reid v. Covert.133 There, the
Court considered whether spouses of U.S. servicemen abroad could be
tried by court martial for murder.134 Black wrote for the plurality that
the Bill of Rights protects citizens overseas, suggesting a universalist
position that the government is a "creature of the Constitution ... [and]
can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the
Constitution." 135
The universalist theory has never found a majority of adherents at
the Court, and no one has supported it as forcefully as Justice Black in
Reid.136 The most consistent objection to applying a "global
Constitution" everywhere at all times stems from the political and
military sensitivities of foreign affairs and the traditionally deferential
role the judicial branch plays in these matters.137 However, more
narrowly couched versions of the structuralist or rights-based
universalist theory continue to appear in contemporary cases, including
Boumediene and its progeny. 138
132 Id. at 364; see Lobel, supra note 110, at 325-26.
133 354 U.S. 1 (1957); see also Kal Raustiala, The Geography of Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV.
2501, 2519 (2005) (observing that Justice Black "seemed to find the underlying territorial logic
of Ross, which the government relied upon in Reid, abhorrent").
134 See Reid, 354 U.S. at 3-4.
135 Id. at 5-6. "Although Reid only dealt with the rights of citizens abroad, not aliens, one
could read into Black's opinion the view that every provision of the Constitution must always
be deemed applicable to U.S. government actions abroad." Lobel, supra note 110, at 314; see
also Raustiala, supra note 133, at 2519 ("As a doctrinal matter, this holding was limited to
American citizens. But the underlying rationale for this limitation was unclear.... Reid
certainly seems reflective of the rising rights consciousness of the 1950s-it was decided just a
few years after Brown v. Board of Education and has a ringing, landmark tone.").
136 See Lobel, supra note 110, at 314-15.
137 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275 (1990) (plurality opinion)
("For better or worse, we live in a world of nation-states in which our Government must be able
to 'functio[n] effectively in the company of sovereign nations.'" (quoting Perez v. Brownwell,
356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958))); see also Lobel, supra note 110, at 315 (noting the judiciary's "practical
fear of overly constraining the political branches' ability to conduct U.S. foreign policy").
138 See Guinevere E. Moore & Robert T. Moore, The Extraterritorial Application of the Fifth
Amendment: A Need for Expanded Constitutional Protections, 46 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1, 17-18
(2014) (highlighting Justice Kennedy's restrained reliance on fundamental rights and
separation of powers considerations when applying the functional test in Boumediene).
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B. The Constitution as Contract: The Social Compact Theory
In contrast to the universalist theory, supporters of the social
compact theory-that the Constitution represents a voluntary contract
between a government and its people-have traditionally advocated for
a much more circumscribed role for the Constitution abroad. At its
strict territorial extreme, Justice Field held for a unanimous Court in In
re Ross that "[t]he Constitution can have no operation in another
country," and thus that the restraints on government action articulated
by the Constitution indeed could be switched off at the border.139
A majority of the Court appeared to embrace this approach in
Johnson v. Eisentrager, decided seven years before Reid. There, the Court
held that habeas corpus was unavailable to German nationals convicted
of war crimes by military commission and then imprisoned in occupied
Germany.140 The majority opinion seemed to suggest that constitutional
rights never protect foreign nationals outside the United States: "[I]t [is]
the alien's presence within its territorial jurisdiction that [gives] the
[jiudiciary power to act," and lacking that territorial connection the
judiciary simply has no jurisdiction to grant habeas protections to
aliens.141 In other words, because all of the actions occurred outside the
United States to a noncitizen with no ties to the country, there existed
no social compact, no jurisdiction, and thus no constitutional
protection.
Justice Rehnquist modified the reasoning of this restrictive social
compact approach in 1990, in a case arising from increased U.S.
government global law enforcement activity during the War on
Drugs.142 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez represents perhaps the
Court at its most divided in the extraterritoriality debate, but strangely
united on the initial social contract premise. Justice Rehnquist, writing
for a plurality of four Justices, found that the Fourth Amendment's
139 In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891); see also Bournediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765
(2008) (stating that if the extraterritorial application of habeas turned on the government's
formalistic sovereignty-based test, Congress and the President could "switch the Constitution
on or off at will"). In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 was decided two years after Chae Chan Ping v.
United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889), and collectively the two cases represent the enormously
deferential approach to foreign affairs taken by the Court in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries.
140 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
141 Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 771; see also Moore & Moore, supra note 138, at 11 (noting that
the majority seemed to suggest the prisoners "were not entitled to access to the writ of habeas
corpus because they had been captured, held, and tried outside of the United States where there
was a lack of territorial jurisdiction" (citing Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 768)).
142 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259; see also Neuman, supra note 28, at 1458 (noting that
the case arose from a warrantless search "of an alleged Mexican drug lord, who had already
been convicted in a separate trial of the torture-murder of a U.S. drug enforcement agent").
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Warrant Clause did not apply to a search of an alien's home in Mexico
because "the people" protected by the Fourth Amendment refers to "a
class of persons who are part of a national community or who have
otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be
considered part of that community."143
While Rehnquist did not deny that certain aliens may possess
constitutional rights, he denied them to Verdugo-Urquidez because he
was "an alien who has had no previous siqnificant voluntary connection
with the United States .... "144 Because the foreign national had not
established a voluntary presence in the country, had not been in the
country for any significant duration of time, and had not accepted the
"societal obligations . .. with this country that might place him among
'the people' of the United States," the social compact of the Constitution
did not apply to him. 145
In a stirring dissent, Justice Brennan invoked a broad
interpretation of the social contract theory, arguing that aliens become a
part of the social contract when they become entangled with our
government, whether voluntarily or not. 146 Brennan relied, in part, on
"basic notions of mutuality" to support the application of the Fourth
Amendment to a search of an alien's residence in Mexico.147 To
Brennan, Verdugo-Urquidez was "entitled to the protections of the
Fourth Amendment because our Government, by investigating him and
attempting to hold him accountable under United States criminal laws,
has treated him as a member of our community for purposes of
enforcing our laws. He has become, quite literally, one of the
governed."148
143 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.
144 Id. at 271 (emphasis added).
145 Id. at 272-73; see also Neuman, supra note 28, at 1459 (criticizing Rehnquist's
"amorphous hurdles of presence, duration, and societal obligation that needed to be satisfied
before 'certain constitutional rights' could be extended"). Rehnquist also invoked political
sovereignty in foreign affairs as a reason to tread cautiously in extended constitutional rights
extraterritorially. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275 ("For better or for worse, we live in a
world of nation-states in which our Government must be able to 'functio[n] effectively in the
company of sovereign nations."' (quoting Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958))). But in
doing so, he created an ill-defined standard of the people to fit his social compact purposes, one
"whose limiting effect Kennedy's concurrence rejected." Neuman, supra note 126, at 369.
146 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 279-98.
147 Id. at 284 ("By concluding that respondent is not one of 'the people' protected by the
Fourth Amendment, the majority disregards basic notions of mutuality. If we expect aliens to
obey our laws, aliens should be able to expect that we will obey our Constitution when we
investigate, prosecute, and punish them.").
148 Id.; see also Lobel, supra note 110, at 313-14 ("While the mutuality approach thus
expands the national community to include persons the government seeks to impose our law
on, it fundamentally derives from the social contract premise that constitutional rights only
affix to members of our national community-either broadly or narrowly conceived.").
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The lone dissenting voice from the social contract perspective,
either broadly or narrowly conceived, was Justice Kennedy, who
provided the crucial fifth vote in a separate concurrence that rejected the
"formalistic" social compact approach for a "functional" approach. 149 As
discussed below, Justice Kennedy relied heavily on this concurrence in
Boumediene nearly two decades later.
C. Function over Form: Boumediene v. Bush
While the foregoing Sections suggest a century-long struggle
between broad and narrow normative theories of extraterritoriality,
Justice Kennedy viewed these same precedents as guided primarily by
pragmatic concerns of what is possible and practical.150 In an elegantly
presented exegesis on the Court's extraterritoriality precedent, Kennedy
grounded his majority opinion in Boumediene on these consequentialist
principles. It is to Boumediene and its functional approach that this
Article now turns.
A united majority of five in Boumediene held that alleged "enemy
combatants" held at Guantinamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba could initiate
habeas proceedings in federal court to challenge their indefinite
detention.151 The Court was presented with extreme normative
extraterritorial positions by both sides. For its part, the Government
made the formalistic, territorial argument that the United States lacked
de jure sovereignty over GuantAnamo, and that foreign nationals
detained at locations outside the sovereign territory of the United States
thus had no constitutional protections. 15 2 Petitioners, as well as Judge
Rogers in her dissent at the lower court, argued that structural,
separation of powers limitations on the political branches such as the
Suspension Clause were always applicable, regardless of location.153
149 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 275-78.
150 See Neuman, supra note 116, at 263-66 (summarizing Kennedy's historical review of
precedent for strands of a pragmatic approach).
151 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
152 See Brief for the Respondents at 14, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (No. 06-
1195). This position found support with a majority on the D.C. Circuit panel, Boumediene v.
Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007), rev'd, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), and with Justice Scalia in
dissent. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 842 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[A]liens abroad have no
substantive rights under our Constitution.").
153 See Brief for Petitioners at 12-16, Al Odah v. United States, No. 06-1196 (Aug. 24, 2007);
see also Boumediene, 476 F.3d at 994-95 (Rogers, J., dissenting) ("[T]he court fundamentally
misconstrues the nature of suspension: Far from conferring an individual right that might
pertain only to persons substantially connected to the United States, the Suspension Clause is a
limitation on the powers of Congress." (internal citation omitted)).
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Justice Kennedy rejected both absolutist positions. Instead, the
Court adopted a pragmatic, functional test that determined whether a
particular constitutional provision applied extraterritorially on a case-
by-case basis, emphasizing the particular circumstances and practical
necessities of each situation, not formalistic principles.154 In doing so,
Kennedy summarized the Court's prior exploration of the
Constitution's geographic scope, finding practical considerations of
paramount importance in a century of extraterritorial jurisprudence.55
Turning first to the Insular Cases, Kennedy observed the Court
making two competing observations: 1) that the Constitution applied of
its own force in the newly acquired territories, but that 2) there may be a
"disruptive effect of immediately imposing a new legal culture on a
society previously accustomed to a different legal system .... "156 The
Court resolved this tension with a compromise: only a subset of so-
called fundamental constitutional rights would be extended to
"unincorporated territories" not expected to become states of the
Union.157 "[N]oting the inherent practical difficulties of enforcing all
constitutional provisions 'always and everywhere,' the Court devised in
the Insular Cases a doctrine that allowed it to use its power sparingly
and where it would be most needed."158
In Eisentrager, Justice Kennedy discounted Justice Jackson's broad
territorial limitations as dictum and focused instead on the "practical
considerations" guiding the discussion and decision in Eisentrager.159
Kennedy found the substantial discussion of practical reasons why
habeas corpus should be unavailable to the German war prisoners as
154 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 764-67.
155 See Neuman, supra note 116, at 263-64 (observing that Kennedy's lengthy discussion of
practical concerns in these earlier cases thus "amplified the methodology he had outlined in his
short concurring opinion in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez"); see also Boumediene, 553 U.S.
at 756-64.
156 Neuman, supra note 116, at 264; see Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 757 ("At least with regard to
the Phillippines, a complete transformation of the prevailing legal culture would have
been... disruptive .... "); see also United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277-78
(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (plurality opinion) (recalling the Insular Cases' broad finding
that the Constitution applies wherever the government acts, although that does not mean every
provision applies in every situation).
157 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 757 (framing the resultant "doctrine of territorial
incorporation, under which the Constitution applies in full in incorporated Territories surely
destined for statehood but only in part in unincorporated Territories" as a balance based on
practical "considerations" rather than a bright line normative judgment).
158 Id. at 759 (internal citation omitted).
159 See id. at 762-63 ("True, the Court in Eisentrager ... noted the prisoners 'at no relevant
time were within any territory over which the United States is sovereign, and [that] the scenes
of their offense, their capture, their trial, and their punishment were all beyond the territorial
jurisdiction of any court of the United States.'... [But] we do not accept the idea that the
above-quoted passage from Eisentrager is the only authoritative language in the opinion and
that all the rest is dicta." (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950))).
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necessary to the judgment. 160 In short, the case should be understood as
consistent with the functional approach: "A constricted reading of
Eisentrager overlooks what we see as a common thread uniting the
Insular Cases, Eisentrager, and Reid: the idea that questions of
extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not
formalism."161
Justice Kennedy saw the functional approach again at work in Reid,
this time discounting as dictum the broad universalist theory of Justice
Black, and focusing on the concurrences of Justices Frankfurter and
Harlan.162 Unlike Black, Frankfurter and Harlan concluded that the
Constitution required civilian jury trial for capital cases but not
necessarily for lesser offenses.163 As Kennedy emphasized, both
Frankfurter and Harlan relied on "practical considerations that made
jury trial a more feasible option" in the current situation.164 Harlan's
opinion articulated a flexible methodology that Kennedy himself later
employed in his Verdugo-Urquidez concurrence: "[W]hether a
constitutional provision has extraterritorial effect depends upon the
'particular circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible
alternatives which Congress had before it' and, in particular, whether
judicial enforcement of the provision would be 'impracticable and
anomalous.'"165
Justice Kennedy's Verdugo-Urquidez concurrence, which provided
the crucial fifth vote denying Fourth Amendment protections to a
Mexican national, breathed new life into Harlan's Reid concurrence.1 66
Kennedy first rejected both the absolutist views of the social compact
160 See id. at 763-66 ("[T]he [Eisentrager] Court mentioned the concept of territorial
sovereignty only twice in its opinion. That the Court devoted a significant portion of Part II to a
discussion of practical barriers to the running of the writ suggests that the Court was not
concerned exclusively with the formal legal status of Landsberg Prison but also with the
objective degree of control the United States asserted over it Even if we assume the Eisentraeer
Court considered the United States' lack of formal legal sovereignty over Landsberg Prison as
the decisive factor in that case, its holding is not inconsistent with a functional approach to
questions of extraterritoriality." (internal citation omitted)).
161 Id. at 764. Justice Kennedy also noted that the petitioners in Eisentrager had access to a
form of due process much closer to constitutional due process than the summary military
commissions at issue in Bournediene. Id. at 766-67.
162 See id. at 759 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957)).
163 Id. ("Justice Harlan ... was most explicit in rejecting a 'rigid and abstract rule' for
determining where constitutional guarantees extend. He read the Insular Cases to teach that
whether a constitutional provision has extraterritorial effect depends upon the 'particular
circumstances, the practical necessities, and the possible alternatives which Congress had before
it' and, in particular, whether judicial enforcement of the provision would be 'impracticable and
anomalous.'" (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 74-75) (citation omitted)).
164 Id. at 761.
165 Id. at 759 (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 74-75 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
166 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 275-78 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (plurality opinion).
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theorists and the universalists. 167 In framing the Constitution as a form
of structural restraint on the government, Kennedy argued that the lack
of a contractual relation between noncitizens and the government does
not act as a limiting force on the Constitution's extraterritorial
applicability:
Though it must be beyond dispute that persons outside the United
States did not and could not assent to the Constitution, that is quite
irrelevant to any construction of the powers conferred or the
limitations imposed by it.... The force of the Constitution is not
confined because it was brought into being by certain persons who
gave their immediate assent to its terms. 168
But Kennedy also rejected the absolutist view of the universalists.
In quoting Justice Harlan's concurrence in Reid, Kennedy reasoned that
extraterritorial applicability of a specific constitutional provision must
take into account "the conditions and considerations .. . that would
make adherence to a specific guarantee altogether impracticable and
anomalous."169 In citing the "wholly dissimilar traditions and
institutions" in Mexico, Kennedy concluded:
The absence of local judges or magistrates available to issue warrants,
the differing and perhaps unascertainable conceptions of
reasonableness and privacy that prevail abroad, and the need to
cooperate with foreign officials all indicate that the Fourth
Amendment's warrant requirement should not apply in Mexico as it
does in this country.1 70
On the basis of these general considerations, Kennedy concluded in
Boumediene that:
[A]t least three factors are relevant in determining the reach of the
Suspension Clause: (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and
the adequacy of the process through which that status determination
was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and then
detention took place; and (3) the practical obstacles inherent in
resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the writ.171
The first factor actually implicated three distinct concepts:
citizenship (petitioners were noncitizens); status (petitioners were
167 See id. at 277 (finding that "[t]he force of the Constitution is not confined because it was
brought into being by certain persons who gave their immediate assent to its terms," but
cautioning that "I cannot agree with the suggestion that every provision of the Constitution
must always be deemed automatically applicable to American citizens in every part of the
world" (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 74)).
168 Id. at 276.
169 Id. at 277-78 (citation omitted).
170 Id. at 278.
171 Boumediene v. United States, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008).
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alleged "enemy combatants"); and the adequacy of the process leading
that determination, which fell "well short of the procedures and
adversarial mechanisms that would eliminate the need for habeas
corpus review."72 Regarding the second factor, the apprehensions and
detentions occurred outside the de jure borders of the United States, "a
factor that weighs against finding they have rights under the Suspension
Clause." However, Kennedy found that U.S. control at Guantinamo was
absolute and indefinite, in contrast with U.S. control in occupied
Germany, which was temporary and "answerable to its Allies . . . ."173
Kennedy emphasized that "[i]n every practical sense Guantinamo is not
abroad.... "174 Regarding "practical obstacles," Kennedy found an
absence of political instability, military insecurity, or "friction with the
host government" sufficient to render extension of the writ
impracticable and anomalous.175 "Were that not the case, or if the
detention facility were located in an active theater of war, arguments
that issuing the writ would be 'impracticable or anomalous' would have
more weight." 176
Taking these factors together, Kennedy concluded that the
Suspension Clause "has full effect at Guantinamo Bay," and that
Congress had stripped the federal courts of habeas jurisdiction without
providing an adequate substitute in violation of the Suspension
Clause. 177
While the Boumediene functional compromise purports to find a
practical balance between two extreme normative positions, throughout
the opinion Kennedy emphasizes the dual universalist importance of
fundamental rights and separation of powers when discussing habeas
corpus. For example, the Court viewed habeas as both an individual
right and a critical, structural, separation-of-powers provision, terming
habeas "a right of first importance"178 and "an essential mechanism in
the separation-of-powers scheme," and noting that the Suspension
Clause served "the need for structural barriers against arbitrary
suspensions of the writ."l79 Kennedy also argued that when the
government acts abroad against aliens or citizens, its powers are not
172 Id. at 766-67.
173 Id. at 768.
174 Id. at 769.
175 Id. at 769-70.
176 Id. at 770 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
177 Id. at 771.
178 Id. at 798.
179 Id. at 743-45; see also id. at 765 (noting that concern about manipulation was particularly
relevant in the context of habeas corpus, which "is itself an indispensable mechanism for
monitoring the separation of powers"); Neuman, supra note 116, at 266 ("Under the
constitutional separation of powers, it is the Supreme Court's responsibility to say what the
Constitution requires.").
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"absolute and unlimited," but are subject "to such restrictions as are
expressed in the Constitution," including restrictions against
suspending the writ. 180
These normative universalist underpinnings stand "in considerable
tension with the separation of powers concerns that the Court claimed
were central to its opinion."181 For example, the Court rejected the
formalistic sovereignty-based test as a way "for the political branches to
govern without legal constraint."182 To do so would allow for a "striking
anomaly in our tripartite system of government, leading to a regime in
which Congress and the President, not this Court, say 'what the law is,"'
and "switch the Constitution on or off at will."183 "But the Court's
functional test permits and indeed encourages the government to do
just that."184
This tension between the universalist reasoning and the functional
test holding of Bournediene has caused considerable confusion for lower
courts in the post-Boumediene era, as highlighted below.
D. Lower Court Resistance: "Effectively Overruling" Boumediene?
While Kennedy's Boumediene decision lacked precision in
articulating the theoretical grounding for the functional test, it remained
consistent on one point-that for at least a five-member majority of the
Court, the strict social compact test of the Verdugo-Urquidez plurality
was no longer favored. However, "[d]espite the Supreme Court's
repudiation of the Verdugo-Urquidez plurality's approach in
Boumediene, some lower courts have continued to give that approach
180 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765 (quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885)); see also
Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common Law of Habeas, 95 IOWA
L. REV. 445, 466 (2010) (arguing that "the normative justification that most fully accounts for
[Justice Kennedy's] view is rooted in separation of powers"); Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene's
Quiet Theory: Access to Courts and the Separation of Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107,
2110 (2009) (asserting that Kennedy's decision was driven by "a structural mechanism" more
than any individual rights theory).
181 See Lobel, supra note 110, at 317; see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 843 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion's "rule" would seem to lead to executive
detentions without judicial review, while the separation-of-powers "rationale" would preclude
such a result).
182 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765.
183 Id.
184 See Lobel, supra note 110, at 317 ("Indeed, the Court's three-factor functional test for
determining the reach of the Suspension Clause virtually ignores the separation of powers
concerns that purportedly were crucial to its analysis."); see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 843
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion's "rule" would seem to lead to executive
detentions without judicial review, while the separation-of-powers "rationale" would preclude
such a result).
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careful, or even eager, allegiance."185 The D.C. Circuit, which was
reversed in Boumediene, has narrowly limited Boumediene's reach to the
Suspension Clause and has continued to employ a strict territorial
sovereignty test that aliens without presence or property in the United
States have no constitutional rights-not even the right not to be
tortured. 186
The D.C. Circuit even followed the approach of the Verduizo-
Urquidez plurality to hold that the Guantinamo detainees were not
"persons" within the meaning of the Religious Freedom and Restoration
Act (RFRA), because Congress did not intend for RFRA to exceed the
scope of the First Amendment, and aliens outside the de jure sovereign
territory of the United States had no First Amendment rights.187 This
steady stream of lower court decisions ignoring or narrowly cabining
Boumediene's functional test in favor of the formalistic Verduizo-
Urquidez test has led at least one scholar to observe that these decisions
have "effectively overruled" Boumediene.188
At times the D.C. Circuit has purported to invoke a version of the
Boumediene functional test, even offering lip service to the structural
separation of powers reasoning underlying that decision. But to the
extent any functional test factors are applied at all they are done so in a
highly formalistic, territorial manner. For example, in Atamirazayeva v.
United States, decided just one month after Boumediene, the D.C.
Circuit denied an Uzbek woman from asserting a claim that the U.S.
embassy's forcible expulsion of her and destruction of her cafeteria to
increase embassy security amounted to an unconstitutional taking.189
The Court appeared to be applying a hybrid of the VerdugZo-Urquidez
significant voluntary connection test and the Boumediene
185 Neuman, supra note 28, at 1465.
186 See, e.g., Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 771-72 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (denying that
Boumediene affected circuit precedent denying extraterritorial due process rights to aliens
alleging torture in Iraq and Afghanistan); Rasul v. Myers (Rasul ll), 563 F.3d 527, 529 (D.C. Cir.
2009) (per curiam) (same at Guantinamo). Some lower courts have continued to cite Verdugo-
Urquidez as denying nonresident aliens "standing" to raise constitutional claims. See, e.g.,
Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, No. 1:12-MC-65 LAK/CFH, 2013 WL 3228753, at *11-14
(N.D.N.Y. June 25, 2013) (denying Ecuadorian litigants standing to object to subpoenas on
First Amendment grounds, because they are not part of the "people" under Verdugo-Urquidez);
Doe v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 546, 551, 575-76 (Fed. Cl. 2010) (denying Iraqi national
standing to challenge military occupation of his home in Fallujah as a taking).
187 See Rasul v. Myers (Rasul 1), 512 F.3d 644, 671-72 (D.C. Cir. 2008). A concurring judge
objected to the panel's acquiring "the unfortunate and quite dubious distinction of being the
only court to declare those held at Guantinamo are not 'person [s],"' and would have rested the
decision on qualified immunity. Id. at 676 (Brown, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
188 See Alexander, supra note 26, at 593-606.
189 Atamirzayeva v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 378, 387 (Fed. Cl. 2007), affd, 524 F.3d 1320
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
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"impracticable and anomalous" test,190 but then only mentioned one
factor as dispositive in the functional analysis: the fact that the claim had
been brought by a noncitizen abroad. 191
E. The Next Chapter: Hernandez v. Mesa
A more recent case, Hernandez v. United States, has squarely pitted
the Verdugo-Urquidez territorial holdovers against the Boumediene
consequentialists.192 In Hernandez, a border patrol officer standing in
the United States shot and killed a Mexican national standing on
Mexican soil. The Fifth Circuit held that the U.S. Constitution afforded
no protection to the Mexican national because he was not on U.S. soil.193
In their respective briefs before the Supreme Court, the parties squarely
framed the issue as whether the Boumediene functional approach or the
Verdugo- Urquidez formalist approach applies. 194
Constitutional scholars eagerly awaited the Court's ruling in Mesa,
which seemed poised to resolve the simmering tension between the
formalist social compact and functional consequentialist approaches.195
The Court left these scholars-and more importantly, the litigants
themselves-empty handed. After years of anticipation, the Court
vacated and remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals to
reconsider the availability of a Bivens action in light of the Court's
recent decision in Ziglar v. Abassi.196 The Court avoided the
190 The Court referred alternately to the "substantial connections" test and the "without
inconvenience and practical difficulty test." Id.
191 See id.
192 Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam), vacated sub nom.
Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (per curiam), reh'g en banc granted, 869 F.3d 357
(5th Cir. 2017).
193 Id. at 121.
194 See Brief for Petitioners at i, Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (No. 15-118)
("Does a formalist or functionalist analysis govern the extraterritorial application of the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition on unjustified deadly force ... ?"); Brief on the Merits for
Respondent at 4, Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (No. 15-118) ("The Petitioners' claim for Fourth
Amendment protection was answered in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259
(1990); and the functionality test put forth in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) does not
apply in cases where the United States clearly exercises no power, control, or authority over the
area/territory where the incident complained of occurs.").
195 See, e.g., Andrew Kent, What Happened in Hernandez v. Mesa?, LAWFARE (June 27, 2017,
2:23 PM), https://lawfareblog.com/what-happened-hernandez-v-mesa (remarking that the case
"had the potential to generate a very important opinion: the Fourth Amendment issue in the
case could impact the legality of worldwide extraterritorial national security activities by the
U.S. government like electronic surveillance and drone strikes").
196 See Mesa, 137 S. Ct. at 2006-07 ("The Court of Appeals here, of course, has not had the
opportunity to consider how the reasoning and analysis in Abassi may bear on this case .... In
these circumstances, it is appropriate for the Court of Appeals, rather than this Court, to
address the Bivens question in the first instance." (citations omitted)).
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extraterritorial question altogether, but not without first recognizing
that "[t]he Fourth Amendment question in this case... is sensitive and
may have consequences that are far reaching."197 Interestingly, Justices
Breyer and Ginsburg dissented, adopting the plaintiffs' functionalist
view of extraterritoriality and the Fourth Amendment. 198
While the issue remains unsettled for now, cases like Hernandez v.
Mesa have brought "to light other configurations ... unrelated to
counterterrorism, where the implications of Boumediene for
extraterritorial application of the Bill of Rights can be explored."199
Trump's doctrine of extreme vetting promises to raise other
configurations where "the depth or shallowness of Justice Kennedy's
functional approach [can] become clear."200
F. Summary
Part II illustrates the continuing force of competing normative and
consequentialist strands of extraterritorial theory. While "[d]etention in
custody by the United States, with or without criminal prosecution,
should ordinarily be enough to start the analysis .... In non-custodial
situations, threshold criteria relevant to the particular right may need to
be identified."201 Part III attempts to establish those threshold criteria by
examining how the various strands of extraterritorial jurisprudence
might be applied to the non-custodial situation of immigrants abroad.
III. THEORIES OF EXTRATERRITORIAL IMMIGRATION JURISPRUDENCE
Part II highlights the unsettled nature not just of extraterritorial
jurisprudential outcomes, but of the very underlying theories guiding
these outcomes. Given this current state, any predictive application of
extraterritoriality must take into account all of the disparate normative
and consequentialist strands of extraterritoriality that continue to
surface. This Part examines these strands individually and applies them
197 Id. at 2007 ("It would be imprudent for this Court to resolve that issue when, in light of
the intervening guidance provided in Abassi, doing so may be unnecessary to resolve this
particular case.").
198 See id. at 2008-11 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (applying the functional factors of Boumediene
v. Bush).
199 Neuman, supra note 28, at 1469.
200 Id.
201 Id. at 1467 ("Until the Supreme Court better articulates the threshold for applying the
functional approach, lower courts are likely either to be groping case by case, or to rely on
crude categorizations that the Court has rejected.... For the present, the indeterminate
concept of a substantial connection may continue to play a role.").
2018] 1161
CARDOZO LA W RE VIEW
specifically to the immigration context. As illustrated below, the answer
to the question whether and how the Constitution applies abroad to
immigration law varies greatly depending on the underlying
philosophical approach employed, highlighting the need for a unified,
coherent, and justifiable theory.
A. Geographic Formalism: Physical Limits of Extraterritorial
Rights
Despite Justice Kennedy's clear rejection of a formalistic, territorial
approach to extraterritorial jurisprudence in Boumediene, the century-
old approach continues to have life in the D.C. Circuit and elsewhere.202
Perhaps no case encapsulates this formalistic adherence to Verdugo-
Urquidez quite like Hernandez v. Mesa, in which the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the Constitution did not extend the few feet beyond
the U.S. southern border into Mexico where a child was shot and killed
by a U.S. border patrol agent.203
Clearly, under this approach, no immigrant outside the physical
borders of the United States would have recourse to challenge any of
President Trump's immigration policies on constitutional grounds. This
formalistic approach not only would foreclose the possibility of relief for
the Syrian national with valid immigration paperwork but stuck in his
home country, but also for the Iraqi or Somali national detained at JFK
airport and subject to the "entry fiction."204 This second scenario would
appear to directly contradict the holding in Boumediene,205 yet lower
courts' ongoing willingness to ignore or arbitrarily limit that holding at
least call into question the outcome of such a scenario.
The more difficult geographic formalism question concerns not the
physical presence of the individual immigrant but of the U.S.
government. In virtually all of the prior cases in the extraterritorial
202 See infra Section III.D.
203 See supra text accompanying notes 194-98.
204 See Slocum, supra note 49, at 1023-25 (discussing the history and development of the
entry fiction, including the "notorious cases" holding that an alien detained for years at New
York's Ellis Island is not within the territorial borders of the United States); see also Ernesto
HernAndez-L6pez, Kiyemba, Guantdnamo, and Immigration Law: An Extraterritorial
Constitution in a Plenary Power World, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 193, 195 (2012) (discussing the
dependability of the entry fiction and plenary power doctrine to foreclose any discussion of
extraterritorial constitutional rights applicability).
205 See Brief of the American Civil Liberties Union and ACLU of Washington as Amici
Curiae in Opposition to Appellant's Motion for a Stay at 4-5, Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d
1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-35105), ECF No. 24-2 (ACLU amicus brief asserting that
immigrants detained at airports after implementation of the Executive Order violates
Boumediene).
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canon, the United States government undoubtedly had engaged in some
affirmative action abroad, whether it be the establishment of new
territories,206 the detention of German war prisoners20 7, or the
demolition of an Uzbeki woman's diner.208 The enactment and
enforcement of a nationwide immigration policy, by contrast, arguably
is an action taken by the U.S. government within the United States and
merely enforced at its border.
This highly formalistic approach to "presence" fails for several
reasons. First, to the extent that individual immigrants remain outside
the United States at ports of entry due to the entry fiction, so too should
the action taken by immigration officials at the border be considered
extraterritorial. Second, existing precedent supports, at a minimum, the
analysis of certain immigration challenges under a rubric of
extraterritorial government action abroad, regardless of the ultimate
outcome. 209 Third, and perhaps most importantly, a broad, universally-
applied immigration classification system such as the Executive Order is
but one method of immigration control. Indeed, the vast majority of
immigration decisions are made on an individualized basis at embassies,
consulates, and refugee resettlement processing centers across the globe.
To the extent a constitutional challenge is leveled arising from one of
these individual encounters, the challenged government action
undoubtedly would have occurred extraterritorially. Unfortunately,
under a geographic formalism approach, the extraterritorial immigrant
also would have no recourse under a Constitution which reaches its end
at the U.S. border.
The simplistic appeal of such an approach is obvious. Yet what this
approach offers in ease of application it lacks in moral or logical
foundation. At its root, this approach fails entirely to answer "the
eternal question of why a state should be permitted to violate in one
location a right that it must respect as fundamental in another
location."210 It also fails to account for the highly peculiar result that an
immigrant who illegally crosses the border onto U.S. soil immediately
gains the protection of virtually all constitutional provisions while the
foreign national waiting for years to lawfully enter enjoys none of those
protections. 211
206 See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (discussing whether constitutional
provisions applied in newly acquired territory of Puerto Rico).
207 See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
208 See Atamirzayeva v. United States, 524 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
209 See Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 669 F.3d 983, 995-97 (9th Cir. 2012) (analyzing
lawful permanent resident's extraterritorial due process challenge under the Verdugo-Urquidez
"significant voluntary connection" test).
210 Neuman, supra note 116, at 260.
211 Kendall Coffey, The Due Process Right to Seek Asylum in the United States: The
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B. The Constitution as Contract: The Social Compact Theory
The enduring appeal of Verdugo-Urquidez to lower courts seeking
to dodge the impact of Boumediene also ensures that the "significant
voluntary connection" test will continue to play a role in future
extraterritoriality cases. 212 This test, premised on the amorphous hurdles
of presence, duration, and societal obligation continue to be applied
with predictably troubling results. For example, the Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces found that a foreign interpreter working as a civilian
contractor in Iraq could not assert Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights in a
court martial hearing for minor offenses because his years of "service
with the Armed Forces of the United States in the uniform of the United
States in sustained combat" after receiving pre-deployment military
training in Georgia did not amount to a sufficient significant voluntary
connection under Verdugo-Urquidez.213
The "xenophobic rhetoric"214 of Verdugo-Urquidez and untethered
invocation of one-sided obligations notwithstanding, the strict
significant voluntary connection test provides greater extraterritorial
constitutional protections to at least some classes of immigrants than
does the geographic formalism approach.215 Presumably, at least those
immigrants who have lawfully resided in the United States for years will
have established sufficient presence, duration, and societal obligation to
invoke constitutional protection should they find themselves on the
wrong end of a government action while abroad.
Immigration Dilemma and Constitutional Controversy, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 303, 309 (2001)
("Because aliens who illegally crossed borders in the dead of night achieved a 'deportable' status
while aliens detained when attempting to enter lawfully were deemed 'excludables,' the law
rewarded those illegal and undocumented aliens who successfully avoided our laws by evading
interception.").
212 See Neuman, supra note 28, at 1469 ("Until the Supreme Court better articulates the
threshold for applying the functional approach, lower courts are likely either to be groping case
by case, or to rely on crude categorizations that the Court has rejected ... . For the present, the
indeterminate concept of a substantial connection may continue to play a role.").
213 United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 278 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (Concurring only in the result,
Chief Judge Baker challenged the application of the Verdugo-Urquidez test, noting that "service
with the Armed Forces of the United States in the uniform of the United States in sustained
combat is a rather substantial connection to the United States.").
214 Neuman, supra note 28, at 1466 (positing that the "xenophobic rhetoric" has infected
various areas of jurisprudence, and may be responsible for the mythical proposition by at least
one court that nonresidential aliens ought to be denied federal court access on prudential
standing grounds to litigate common law claims).
215 At least theoretically, the petitioner in Verdugo-Urquidez might have prevailed had he
voluntarily lived in the United States for ten years prior to having his home in Mexico searched.
A geographic formalist would have denied even that claim because at the time of the search
both Verdugo-Urquidez and his home were in Mexico.
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Consider the case of Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland
Security.216 A Malaysian national had lawfully resided in the United
States for four years as a doctoral student at Stanford.217 She flew to
Malaysia for a conference connected to her studies but was never
allowed reentry into the United States because of her (mistaken)
presence on the government's No-Fly List.218 A divided Ninth Circuit
panel applied Verdugo-Urquidez to find that she had established a
significant voluntary connection with the United States and could assert
claims under the First and Fifth Amendments.219 Notably, however, the
Ninth Circuit's analysis rested in part on the fact that the petitioner's
travels abroad were specifically for "[t]he purpose
of... further[ing] ... her connection to the United States."220 One
wonders, therefore, whether a lawful resident's travel abroad for some
reason other than to further her voluntary connections with the United
States, such as attending a funeral, would sever the cord of
voluntariness.
For immigrants with a less substantial connection to the United
States than years of lawful residency, the prospects of extraterritorial
constitutional protection under this test appear markedly less bright. In
particular, those immigrants and refugees who have subjected
themselves to years of screenings, interviews, and background checks by
U.S. government officials to receive the privilege of entering the country
but have not yet physically entered, likely lack the "presence" necessary
to establish a substantial voluntary connection. Moreover, until they
have physically entered the country, a Verdugo-Urquidez rationale
would find that these individuals are pursuing the privilege of societal
obligation with the United States, but have not yet assumed that
obligation.221
"The main difficulty with the compact approach is that it removes
any constitutional limits whatsoever on the government's powers to act
against the class of aliens who can be viewed as outside the social
contract."222 This failing rests in Justice Rehnquist's one-sided definition
216 669 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2012).
217 Id. at 987.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 997 ("She voluntarily established a connection to the United States during her four
years at Stanford University while she pursued her Ph.D. She voluntarily departed from the
United States to present the results of her research at a Stanford-sponsored conference. The
purpose of her trip was to further, not to sever, her connection to the United States, and she
intended her stay abroad to be brief.").
220 Id.
221 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990) (plurality opinion)
(assuming that one must be physically present in the United States, even illegally, to "[have]
accepted some societal obligations").
222 Lobel, supra note 110, at 314.
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of "connection" in Verdugo-Urquidez. In dismissing the connections
that are made between government and individual when one is
involuntarily subjected to U.S. power, he put the entire onus on
noncitizens to establish connections while absolving the government
entirely from any obligation when it establishes such connections.223
Indeed, "[t]he holding in Boumediene frontally contradicts one of the
most unsavory aspects of the Verdugo-Urquidez plurality opinion: the
suggestion that when foreign nationals are arrested or kidnapped
abroad and brought forcibly to U.S. territory, their involuntary presence
is a reason for denying them constitutional rights even within the
territory."224
For a less dramatic, more relevant example, consider the
immigrant in Libya denied a visa to enter the United States because she
is Muslim, whether that discriminatory motive is expressed openly or
concealed by immigration officials. Leaving aside that no right to enter
the country extends to this noncitizen, the U.S. government nevertheless
is establishing a connection with the alien by enforcing its
discriminatory immigration laws to the alien's detriment.225 Clearly, an
immigrant in this situation would find no recourse under the Verdugo-
Urquidez substantial voluntary connection test.
However, Justice Brennan's "far broader, more alien-protective"
social compact theory might provide a theoretical avenue for relief for
such non-detained extraterritorial immigrants.226 Brennan's "basic
notions of mutuality" approach focuses not on the alien's actions but on
the government's actions to "treat[] him as a member of our community
for purposes of enforcing our laws.. . . He [then] has become, quite
literally, one of the governed."227 In the immigration context, an
immigrant adversely affected by the enforcement of our laws may thus
become a member of our community and have the protections of the
Constitution as one of the governed.
223 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 283 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("What the majority
ignores, however, is the most obvious connection between Verdugo-Urquidez and the United
States: he was investigated and is being prosecuted for violations of United States law and may
well spend the rest of his life in a United States prison.").
224 Neuman, supra note 28, at 1459.
225 Though not as dramatic as being investigated and prosecuted for crimes carrying a life
sentence, an immigrant nonetheless subjects himself to the immigration laws of the United
States, and the government does subject the immigrant to those laws. This establishes at least
some connection. Whether it amounts to a significant voluntary connection under Justice
Brennan's approach remains an open question.
226 See Lobel, supra note 110, at 313 ("A far broader, more alien-protective perspective that
is ultimately derived from a social contract understanding of the Constitution's scope
is ... articulated most forcefully in Justice Brennan's dissent in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez....").
227 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 284 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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One may criticize this approach as unduly extending constitutional
rights where someone has affirmatively requested a benefit (admission
to the country) to which she has no right and the government has
merely responded to that request. Yet constitutional protections
routinely attach in similar situations. For example, the government has
no constitutional obligation to provide welfare or social security
benefits, nor does anyone have a constitutional right to such benefits.228
However, once Congress affirmatively decides to offer such
entitlements, it becomes constitutionally obligated to do so in
accordance with the Constitution.229 Likewise, the United States has no
affirmative constitutional obligation to accept immigrants, though it has
made international commitments to accept a certain annual quota of
refugees.230 But once its government decides to accept immigrants, it
must do so within its restrained powers as expressed in the
Constitution. To hold otherwise would be to treat the immigrant
differently from the citizen for no other reason than status, an extreme
approach that has been roundly rejected.231
The real problem with Brennan's expansive social contract theory
is less theoretical than practical. By extending the full panoply of
constitutional protections to all noncitizens abroad who encounter a
U.S. government official, the Court would invite an endless stream of
due process-related litigation that would prove functionally impractical
to litigate from a fact-finding perspective. More fundamentally, such an
extreme normative approach would ignore the practical difficulties of
establishing global due process protections in the innumerable and
vastly different circumstances in which our ever-expanding government
228 See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 610 (1960) (holding that no constitutional
"accrued property rights" exist with respect to any aspect of the Social Security system).
229 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (holding that individuals have a statutorily
granted right to Social Security benefits and a constitutional right to some due process before
denial of those benefits, but not a pre-termination hearing); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires an
evidentiary hearing before a welfare recipient can be denied benefits).
230 See, e.g., James C. Hathaway, Executive (Dis)order and Refugees-The Trump Policy's
Blindness to International Law, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/
37113/executive-disorder-refugees-the-trump-policys-blindness-international-law (discussing
U.S. international commitments to refugee resettlement); Philip E. Wolgin, Renewing the
United States' Global Commitment to Refugee Resettlement, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 19,
2016, 9:03 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/news/2016/09/19/
144339/renewing-the-united-states-global-commitment-to-refugee-resettlement (summarizing.
some of the U.S. resettlement commitments by country, including a commitment to accept
10,000 Syrian refugees in 2016).
231 See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (rejecting formalistic
extraterritorial test based solely on nationality); Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 268-69 (same);
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (same); cf Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 843 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that aliens have no rights under the Constitution).
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finds itself throughout the globe.232 In much the same way that the
plenary power doctrine risks resting too much power in the political
branches, this approach would risk resting too much foreign policy
power in the hands of an ill-equipped judiciary. At most, while this
broad social compact theory has moral and theoretical appeal, its
application should be tempered by a Boumediene-style functional
approach.233
C. A Global Constitution: The Universalist Approach
At its most extreme, the universalist approach to extraterritoriality
states simply that "the Constitution must always be deemed
automatically applicable .. . in every part of the world."234 Analytically,
it is easy to predict whether such a universalist would apply the
Constitution to an immigration challenge. She would. The trickier
question becomes how a universalist would apply the Constitution to an
immigration challenge. Again, at its most logical extreme, a universalist
would support application in precisely the same manner in which it is
applied domestically, regardless of culture, circumstance, or custom.
To do so in the immigration context would require the direct
invalidation of 125 years of plenary power precedent.235 In reality, no
Justice nor Court opinion has ever directly espoused such a rigid
universalist view. Rather, as highlighted above, universalists have sought
a limited, principled extraterritorial application by focusing either on
232 See Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad, 110
COLUM. L. REv. 225, 286-87 (2010) ("Global legal obligations are becoming increasingly
complex.... These challenges will become more acute as transnational interaction increases
with growing collaboration on international trade, law enforcement, and security efforts ... . In
these and other circumstances, effective control may, as a practical matter, be possessed by
multiple actors, and workable international and constitutional doctrines for establishing
accountability will need to be flexible and sensitive to practical realities.").
233 See Burnett, supra note 121, at 1000-15 (discussing the practical benefits of a Boumediene
functional approach, including the ability to account for cultural differences and border
permeability).
234 Reid, 354 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring) (rejecting such an absolute universalist
approach).
235 See generally Martin, supra note 16 (discussing the "enduring legacy" of 125 years of
plenary power). It also would require the Court to turn its back on the reasoning guiding the
plenary power doctrine: namely, that in the fields of foreign affairs, international relations, and
national security, courts are ill-equipped to understand the dynamics at play in a myriad of
volatile and often dangerous circumstances that may require a more flexible approach that
domestic constitutional doctrine can provide. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S.
581, 606 (1889) (explaining that the government has the highest duty "to
preserve... independence, and give security against foreign aggression and
encroachment ... its determination, so far as the subjects affected are concerned, are
necessarily conclusive upon [the judiciary]").
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those fundamental rights that can never be abridged or on those
structural limitations inherent in the Constitution to limit government
action.236
1. Fundamental Principles: The Rights-Based Approach
Justice Brown's opinion in Downes argued that Congress was
bound by certain fundamental or natural rights, which apply "by
inference and the general spirit of the Constitution" rather "than by any
express and direct application of its provisions."237 JUStice White
attempted to put specificity to this inherent, unwritten rights
philosophy, arguing that any law "support[ing] ... an established
religion, or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and
unusual punishments" constitutes "absolute withdrawals of power" and
would automatically be voided as violative of the Constitution.238
In Reid v. Covert, Justice Harlan enunciated the premise that only
those constitutional rights that can be deemed fundamental to any
civilized society apply to government action abroad.239 "These cases
defined fundamental rights against the backdrop of the substantive due
process incorporation jurisprudence of the first half of the twentieth
century, which denoted as fundamental those rights that were 'of the
very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."'240
This observation that fundamental rights extraterritoriality mirrors
domestic incorporation may be descriptively accurate from a historical
perspective, but it does not provide a normative justification for such
expansion. The uneven history of substantive rights incorporation to the
states has been driven as much by the history and intent of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the history of post-Civil War
236 See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 769 (accepting that the government is always limited by the
Constitution, but rejecting claim that all provisions apply "always and everywhere"); Lobel,
supra note 25, at 1651-60 (discussing the historical unwillingness to apply "individual-rights
provisions" of the Constitution extraterritorially).
237 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 268 (1901).
238 Id. at 297-98. Justice White's reference to "absolute withdrawals of power" sound in
structural restraints on governmental action more so than positive individual rights. As
discussed infra, the overlap between these two types of constitutional provisions-structural
and rights-based-renders any principled distinction between them "elusive at best, if not
downright illusory. . . . " Stephen I. Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a Structural Right, 62 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 275, 276 (2008).
239 See Reid, 354 U.S. at 53 (Harlan, J., concurring) (relying on "[t]he 'fundamental right'
test ... which the Court has consistently enunciated in a long series of cases" to determine
extraterritorial constitutional applicability); Downes, 182 U.S. at 291 (White, J., concurring)
("[T]here may nevertheless be restrictions of so fundamental a nature that they cannot be
transgressed, although not expressed in so many words in the Constitution.").
240 Lobel, supra note 25, at 1661 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
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Reconstruction as it has been by any principled jurisprudence. Given
this highly specific history, there seems little principled reason to graft
domestic incorporation onto foreign extraterritoriality.
Another fundamental rights approach that perhaps fits better is the
international human rights approach. In Boumediene, the Court was
urged by several amici filed on behalf of the detainees to make use of
concepts from international human rights law to develop the contours
of which rights might extend extraterritorially.241 Focusing on, among
other things, those rights so fundamentally entrenched in modern
civilized society (as codified in various United Nations treaties) as to be
considered nonderogable or jus cogens, the amici urged that U.S. law be
construed consistently with those obligations.242
In the immigration and refugee context, a fundamental norm that
has become part of the jus cogens international lexicon is the universal
obligation of non-refoulment of refugees.243 Non-refoulment is a norm
found in international refugee, human rights, and humanitarian law,
which requires that states must never send any individual to a country
where she faces a real risk of torture or ill-treatment, persecution,
enforced disappearance, or arbitrary deprivation of life.244 This principle
finds expression in the 1951 Refugee Convention, the Convention
Against Torture, and several other international treaties. These treaties
have also been offered as possible grounds for challenging the Executive
Order or future extreme vetting iterations.245
This attempt to ground extraterritorial application in normative jus
cogens international law is laudable but problematic to the extent that it
purports to articulate the full range of rights that should apply
extraterritorially. These norms should be viewed as the "floor" of rights
that extend beyond our borders, a baseline of rights that need no
241 See, e.g., Brief of International Humanitarian Law Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioners, Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196); Brief of Amicus
Curiae United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in Support of Petitioners,
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (Nos. 06-1195, 06-1196).
242 See Brief of Amicus Curiae United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in
Support of Petitioners at 6-8; see also Lobel, supra note 110, at 310 ("The argument made here
is premised on international law's post-World War II recognition that certain basic norms of
civilized society, such as the prohibitions on torture, genocide, slavery, extrajudicial execution,
and prolonged arbitrary detention without any judicial review are so fundamental as to be
nonderogable under any circumstances."); Neuman, supra note 116, at 275 (discussing UNHCR
brief: "It propounded the current view that all human rights obligations under the Covenant
apply not only within a state's sovereign territory, but also to other territory under the state's
effective control, and to individuals within a state's effective control regardless of location. The
brief observed that this 'authoritative' international interpretation conflicted with the
interpretation favored by the United States.").
243 See Hathaway, supra note 230.
244 Id.
245 Id.
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consequentialist approach to determine whether they should restrain
government actions at a particular time or place.246 But outside the
context of arbitrary or indefinite detention, torture, or other
fundamental jus cogens norms a functional approach may be relevant to
determine whether and how a less fundamental constitutional principle
applies.247
2. Separation of Powers: The Structural Approach
As discussed above, the structural approach to extraterritorial
constitutional application focuses not on the status, location, or rights of
the individual noncitizen, but rather on the limitations the Constitution
places on government action. "Since the beginnings of the republic, the
Court and the political branches have generally viewed the
Constitution's separation-of-powers restraints as applicable wherever
and against whomever the U.S. government acts."248
At first blush, this approach may seem to give carte blanche to the
political branches to deny any extraterritorial rights to immigrants,
insofar as the Constitution and the plenary power doctrine give broad
discretion to the political branches over immigration controls. After all,
if the Constitution applies extraterritorially only to constrain
impermissible government actions, and the Constitution gives the
political branches of the government a blank check to control
immigration as they see fit, then does it not follow that no provisions of
the Constitution apply extraterritorially to immigrants at all?249
As discussed in Part II, the answer to this question must be no.
While a century of plenary power precedent confirms that political
discretion to control immigration is broad, it remains "subject to
important constitutional limitations."250 Those limitations include, at a
246 See Neuman, supra note 116, at 395 ("I believe it unlikely at the present stage of U.S.
constitutional history that the Supreme Court would announce a methodology in which
comparison with a particular international instrument such as the CCPR would operate as
sufficient justification for the application of a constitutional right. Rather, the function served
by an external benchmark would be as part of the response to the concern that the Court was
requiring the United States to comply unilaterally with extraterritorial rights to which the rest
of the world does not adhere.").
247 See id. at 276 ("Yet even if the majority had been willing to invoke international practice,
the international human rights arguments did not specifically favor the functional approach to
extraterritoriality. The claim that all civil and political rights, not merely habeas corpus, should
extend to all individuals within the government's effective control greatly simplifies and makes
highly constraining an inquiry that the functional approach treats as complex and flexible.").
248 Lobel, supra note 25, at 1631.
249 See Spiro, supra note 2.
250 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 695 (2001).
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minimum, the judiciary's ability to review and invalidate immigration
regulations that clearly "violate contemporary constitutional norms."251
The question remains, then, what provisions of the Constitution
sufficiently implicate structural separation of powers concerns to apply
extraterritorially? Some have argued that "a structural limitation
remove[s] the basic competency or power of the government to
act ... while individual-rights provisions accepted the government's
power to act but limited the permissible manner in which the
government exercises its authority."252 Others have focused on whether
the text of the Constitution itself provides a positive individual right or a
negative structural restraint. But this distinction proves more difficult in
practice than theory, "[flor, at bottom, whether the President or
Congress violates the First Amendment, conducts an unreasonable
search, denies aliens due process, tortures them, or violates separation of
powers, the government has exceeded its constitutional authority."253
Take, for example, the religious clauses of the First Amendment.
Textually, the Establishment Clause appears to create a negative
restraint on the government prohibiting it from establishing a religion,
while the free exercise provision appears to grant a positive right of
individuals to freely practice the religion of their choice.254 Does it
follow, then, that the Establishment Clause challenges to the Executive
Order would survive as implicating extraterritorial structural restraints
on government action while the free exercise challenges would not? This
result seems illogical, given the intertwined nature of these clauses and
the overlap in jurisprudential tests. Moreover, the entire First
Amendment begins with the structural restraint, "Congress shall make
no law . . "255
Or consider the equal protection provision of the Fifth
Amendment. No one questions the government's lawful authority to
discriminate among classes of people in enacting legislation and
regulations. Because the government has the "power to act" in this
regard but is limited in the "permissible manner in which [it] exercises
its authority," does this mean that the Equal Protection Clause creates a
positive individual right rather than a negative structural restraint,
meaning that the government is free to discriminate extraterritorially in
251 Chin, supra note 20, at 259.
252 Lobel, supra note 25, at 1656 (discussing amicus brief in Hamdan).
253 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
254 See Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 835 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that an overseas
religious program violated the Establishment Clause and reasoning that the First Amendment
"prohibition against establishments of religion targets the competency of Congress to enact
legislation of that description-irrespective of time or place").
255 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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noxious ways it could not at home?256 The same analysis applies to the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Undoubtedly, the
government has the power to act to enact and control legal processes, so
is due process of law an individual right that constrains this power to
act? From a textual perspective, does the clause "[n]o person shall
be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law"
implicate a structural restraint or an individual right?257 Would the
analysis truly differ if the Fifth Amendment said "persons shall have the
right to due process of law" or "Congress shall not deprive persons of
due process of law?"
Thus, it appears a strict structuralist interpretation of the
Constitution might deprive immigrants from any meaningful
extraterritorial constitutional protections, even those fundamental
rights such as freedom of religion, equal protection, and due process of
law.258 But this approach is unsound, because a bright line distinction
between rights and limitations is unworkable in practice, as many
provisions of the Constitution implicate structural and rights-based
concerns. 259 For example, Justice Kennedy emphasized the importance
of habeas relief as "an essential mechanism in the separation-of-powers
scheme," but also emphasized the importance of habeas as a
fundamental constitutional right.260 Similarly, the framers viewed the
constitutional prohibition on Bills of Attainder as an important
individual right even though it has largely been viewed by courts and
scholars as a structural restraint.261
In short, it has long been recognized that "the Government may act
only as the Constitution authorizes, whether the actions in question are
foreign or domestic."262 But if one rejects the structural/individual-
rights dichotomy and views the entire Constitution as a limiting power
256 Lobel, supra note 25, at 1655.
257 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
258 See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901) (recognizing that the Constitution's "absolute
withdrawals of power" included such individual rights as those contained in the First, Fifth, and
Eighth Amendments).
259 See Lobel, supra note 25, at 1654-55 ("Other important rights also serve a dual structural
and individual function. For example, the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment was in
part designed to serve a separation-of-powers function by interposing a judicial officer between
the police and the target of the search. So too, the guarantees of a jury trial reflect not merely
individual rights, but also basic structural concerns about the amount of power granted to a
particular judge. Yet neither the Fourth Amendment's Warrant Clause nor the Sixth
Amendment's right to a jury trial is applicable extraterritorially to non-citizens, despite their
clear structural functions.").
260 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 743-45 (2008) (noting that the Suspension Clause
served "the need for structural barriers against arbitrary suspensions of the writ").
261 See Lobel, supra note 25, at 1655-56.
262 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(plurality opinion).
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on the government, whether its actions are foreign or domestic, one
returns to the absolutist view that all of the Constitution applies "always
and everywhere." This creates the same judicial usurpation problems
discussed above. Two important limitations can and should work to
limit these problems. First, even if all of the provisions of the
Constitution apply extraterritorially, how they apply abroad need not
precisely mirror how they are applied domestically.263 Second, practical
considerations can and should play a role in determining the extent to
which it would be impracticable and anomalous to constraint
government power abroad in particular situations. It is to those practical
concerns we now turn.
D. Function over Form: Back to Boumediene
Given the moral failings of a strict social compact approach and
practical limitations of a broad universalist approach, Justice Kennedy's
functional approach appears again to provide a preferable rubric for
examining extraterritorial constitutional applicability. It also happens to
fit both the descriptive and normative tendencies of modern
extraterritorial case law.264
Because the Boumediene functional test is designed by the Court to
be flexible, adaptable, and changing to the circumstances of a particular
case, it stands to reason that the test itself could and should be modified
when different structural limitations or fundamental rights are
implicated.265
In the immigration context, additional factors unique to that area,
such as foreign policy or political stability considerations, may be
relevant. However, it would be prudent first to apply the articulated
Boumediene factors in deference to the continued precedential value of
that decision. Then, this Section will take Justice Kennedy's suggestion
to adapt this inherently flexible test to the unique situation of
immigrants abroad.
263 See Neuman, supra note 116, at 288 ("It may bear repetition that the functional approach
does not present a binary choice between nonapplication of a constitutional right and
application of the right precisely as it operates in an analogous domestic setting.").
264 Id. at 268-70.
265 In fact, in Boumediene, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the "habeas right is itself an
indispensable mechanism" but did not list the importance of the right implicated as a factor in
his three-part functional test. 553 U.S. at 765-66; see also Neuman, supra note 116, at 287 ("The
Court in Boumediene identified (at least) three sets of factors as relevant to the reach of the
Suspension Clause: status and status certainty; locations of arrest and detention; and practical
obstacles. This nonexclusive list was tailored to the Suspension Clause and its case law, and
would presumably need modification to address other rights.").
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1. Application of the Boumediene Test
The first factor articulated by Justice Kennedy, "the citizenship and
status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which
that status determination was made," facially applies only to the
extraterritorial detention context.266 However, this factor may still have
relevance in the non-detention context if the word "detainee" is replaced
with the word "individual." In doing so, we must then consider three
distinct aspects of this first factor: 1) the citizenship of the immigrant or
refugee; 2) the legal status of that individual; and 3) the adequacy of the
process through which that legal status was conferred.
In the immigration context, all extraterritorial petitioners would be
foreign nationals. Their "status" most naturally would implicate their
status as immigrants or refugees-either immigrants with validly issued
entry documents, potential immigrants who are seeking or have been
denied status, legally recognized refugees, asylum seekers, or those
denied refugee status. This non-exhaustive list illustrates the potentially
limitless application of this first factor to the unique individual
circumstances of extraterritorial immigrants.
Finally, this first factor requires one to consider the adequacy of the
process through which the immigration or refugee decision was made.
For the immigrant whose application is denied, the court would
consider the nature of the immigration official's fact-finding process
preceding that denial, including whether the official conducted in-
person interviews with the applicant and his or her family, what
individualized background checks were conducted, and the basis for the
denial.267 While neither issuance of a visa nor approval for resettlement
is a right, the question is not whether the immigrant or refugee
possesses a constitutional right to the status but whether a constitutional
protection was violated in the course of denying conferral of that status.
266 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766. In this sense, the ACLU's invocation of Boumediene to
challenge the detention of foreign nationals detained at ports of entry in the hours after entry of
the Executive Order made logical and legal sense. See American Civil Liberties Union and
ACLU of Washington's Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici Curiae at 4-5, Washington v.
Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 17-35105), ECF No. 24-1 (asserting that immigrants
detained at airports after implementation of the Executive Order violates Boumediene).
267 A similar evaluation would be undertaken in the case of an asylum seeker denied status,
though in that circumstance the United States is not responsible (at least not solely responsible)
for making that determination when the asylum seeker resides outside U.S. borders. A closer
analog would be the legally recognized refugee seeking but being denied resettlement to the
United States by USCIS or another executive agency. See United States Refugee Admissions
Program (USRAP) Consultation & Worldwide Processing Priorities, USCIS, https://
www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/refugees/united-states-refugee-admissions-
program-usrap-consultation-worldwide-processing-priorities (last updated May 5, 2016)
(discussing national refugee and resettlement admissions programs).
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However, for the immigrant issued a valid visa after successfully
completing the vetting process who later has the visa summarily
canceled in response to a blanket travel ban such as the Executive Order,
which process does the court review for adequacy: the initial screening
process preceding issuance of the visa, or the "process" preceding the
summary revocation? I would argue the latter, as it is the immigrant's
status as a former visa holder that gives rise to the action. In that sense,
there appears to be no individualized process at all, but a blanket
revocation of a benefit previously conferred.268
The second Boumediene factor, "the nature of the sites where
apprehension and then detention took place," again facially applies only
to the detention context. 269 But it takes little imagination to retrofit this
factor to the non-detention context. For immigration purposes, the
court would consider the nature of the sites where the immigration or
refugee decision was made. In the individual status determination
context, the types of sites at which such determinations are made are as
diverse as the cultural, political, and topographical diversity of the earth
itself. Different analytical considerations would be implicated
depending on whether the contact with and determination by an
immigration official took place in an embassy or consulate in a stable
country, in a crowded refugee camp bordering an active conflict, or in
an isolated and remote desert southern border crossing. A narrow
reading of Boumediene would caution against applying the Constitution
extraterritorially to any of these situations, because in none of them
does the United States exercise the kind of indefinite, de facto control
present at Guantinamo Bay.270 Even a more alien-protective
interpretation would struggle to square the reasoning of Boumediene to
the extension of constitutional protections outside of the most stable,
embassy-based locales, in friendly foreign nations. 271 At a minimum, as
268 The "process" considered in such a scenario may in fact be the process by which the
government decided to enact the broad policy implicated, which may very well require judicial
review of the substantive justifications for a particular immigration classification or decision.
269 553 U.S. at 766.
270 See id. at 769 ("In every practical sense, Guantinamo is not abroad...."); see also
Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 127-28 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (finding that the
Boumediene functional test did not apply because the United States exerts neither de jure nor
de facto control over Mexico, even a few feet from the United States' border), vacated sub nom.
Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (per curiam), reh'g en banc granted, 869 F.3d 357
(5th Cir. 2017).
271 Contrary to the common misconception, embassies in foreign countries are not the
"sovereign territory" of that country, but territory of the host country that is afforded special
status under international law. See Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 22, Apr. 18,
1961, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95 (explaining that "[t]he premises of the mission ... shall
be immune from search, requisition, attachment, or execution," but that the territory itself
remains that of the host country); Alfred P. Rubin, Letter to the Editor, U.S. Embassies Are Not
U.S. Territory, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 1, 1984), http://www.nytimes.com/1984/03/01/opinion/1-us-
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with the reasonable reluctance to extend a full panoply of constitutional
due process protections to detainees in active or unsettled war zones,
courts applying the functional test likely would caution against
imposing identical constitutional restraints to an emergent migration
crisis as an office-based consulate hearing.272
As to the third Boumediene factor, "the practical obstacles inherent
in resolving the prisoner's entitlement to the [right]," the existence of
practical obstacles in the immigration context depends on the unique
circumstance of each individualized situation. While U.S. immigration
officials certainly exercise some level of control wherever they conduct
official business on behalf of the executive branch, the permanency of
such control varies depending on whether a permanent U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS) office exists on U.S. embassy
grounds in the United Kingdom, a mobile unit of immigration officials
is conducting screenings in a U.N.-administered refugee camp in a
hostile country, or government officials are responding to a migration
crisis next door to an active civil war. The nature of the relationship
with the host country itself plays a critically important role, particularly
given the political sensitivity inherent in refugee crises and, more
broadly, issues of transnational migration. Serious and legitimate
concerns about the ability of the judicial branch to adequately
understand and weigh these political considerations underlies the
plenary power doctrine and itself gives reason to tread carefully in the
area of extraterritorial constitutional immigration law.273
Another pressing practical obstacle may well be the "logistical
constraints that may result from distance or from the disorder
embassies-are-not-us-territory-022156.html (esteemed professor of international law
explaining that, "[als a matter of international law, an embassy is not 'territory' of the sending
state; it is territory of the receiving state that is accorded, through various treaties and customs,
some immunities from host-country law").
272 Courts may have to engage in fact-specific inquiries regarding the nature of the
purported crisis or threat and the nexus between the threat and the challenged immigration
measure to make the extraterritorial determination. But courts have done this for decades. See,
e.g., Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 757-69 (discussing the nature of the naval base and the nexus
between denying of habeas and fighting the war on terror); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S.
763, 775-80 (1950) (discussing specific nature of the German war prison and the extent of
control exercised by the United States in Allied territory).
273 "Another [concern] is the tendency of the right to interfere with intergovernmental
cooperation in contexts where the United States cannot operate unilaterally." Neuman, supra
note 116, at 269; see also Cleveland, supra note 232, at 287 (noting the increasing complexity
facing extraterritorial constitutional application in a global world governed by "multiple actors"
at once). To this extent, the government may raise legitimate concerns about judicial review of
an immigration decision adversely affecting a "foreign relations mission" with a foreign power.
However, courts should reject any government suggestion that judicial review of an
immigration decision would adversely affect the government's "immigration mission" because
such an argument rests on circular logic.
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prevailing in the location where the right would be enforced."274 This
logistical concern relates directly in many respects to the level-of-
governmental-control concern and should be evaluated along the same
lines.
In short, application of the existing Boumediene factors to the
immigration context requires some mild retrofitting but otherwise
appears to function as Justice Kennedy intended: in a flexible, adaptable
way that likely would yield different results in different contexts. That
said, the imprecision of the Boumediene decision itself and lack of
guidance on how this functional test should apply outside the detention
context leaves much room for speculation as to how that test would
actually apply in the immigration context. A narrow reading of
Boumediene would suggest that non-detained immigrants enjoy no
extraterritorial constitutional protections because they are neither
detained nor otherwise controlled by the United States, they reside in
territories outside the de jure or de facto control of the United States,
and/or the practical obstacles of adjudicating potentially politically
sensitive immigration decisions thousands of miles away in potentially
unstable environments makes such application impractical and
anomalous.275 However, a more sympathetic approach to the functional
test may yield some measure of extraterritorial applicability, at least in
limited circumstances.
2. Application of Other Factors
The list of factors employed in Boumediene "would presumably
need modification to address other rights" besides the right to habeas.276
One such additional factor-the importance of the right implicated-
was discussed at length by Justice Kennedy in Boumediene but
ultimately went unlisted in his functional test approach.277 Whether the
constitutional right implicated is fundamental in a broad sense has
occupied the Court's extraterritoriality jurisprudence for over a century.
Thus, identification and application of other possible Boumediene
factors should start with consideration of the nature and importance of
the right implicated.
In the immigration context, there exists no right to enter the
country, constitutional or otherwise.278 However, the Constitution does
274 Neuman, supra note 116, at 269.
275 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring).
276 Neuman, supra note 116, at 287.
277 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798 (calling habeas "a right of first importance").
278 See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (observing that no right
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protect against various forms of impermissible discrimination,
including on the basis of religion. As early as 1885, Justice Field declared
that any law supporting an established religion would automatically be
void as violative of the Constitution's most fundamental norms. 279 For
that proposition, Field relied on Chief Justice John Marshall's 1828
opinion in American Insurance Company v. Canter, which invoked the
"usage of the world" and various treatises on international law to declare
the right to be free from religious discrimination, an inherent
fundamental norm akin to an international jus cogens norm.280
It then appears that at a minimum, the right to be free from
religious discrimination has a sufficiently fundamental judicial pedigree
as to be invoked extraterritorially to challenge religiously based
immigration classifications or individual immigration decisions based
on invidious religious discrimination. On the other hand, although
freedom of religion is an internationally recognized human right, its
content in the international system and in other countries does not
coincide with U.S. free exercise doctrine.281 Moreover, government
prohibitions against establishing a preferred religion clearly have not
gained widespread international application, perhaps most notably in
the very countries affected by the Executive Order itself.282
This uneven international application of religious discrimination
doctrine does not require, however, categorical denial of extraterritorial
freedom of religion rights to all foreign nationals in all circumstances.
First Amendment free exercise and establishment doctrines are complex
exists for a noncitizen to enter or remain in the country, and thus deportation cannot be
considered a "punishment").
279 See Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 546 (1885).
280 26 U.S. 511, 542 (1828); see also Chim~ne I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders, 36 YALE J.
INT'L L. 55, 61 (2011) (discussing role for considering "a set of fundamental values" in
extraterritoriality analysis); Cleveland, supra note 232, at 282-84 (discussing concept of jus
cogens norms).
281 See Neuman, supra note 126, at 393 (emphasizing the need for a coherent extraterritorial
jurisprudence to "focus on the problem of cultural variation and the possible anomaly of
extending a U.S. constitutional right to foreign territory where a different version of the right
(or none at all) prevails").
282 See Salma Abdelaziz et al., Christian in Sudan Sentenced to Death for Faith; 'I'm Just
Praying,' Husband Says, CNN (May 16, 2014, 8:31 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/15/
world/africa/sudan-christian-woman-apostasy/index.html (reporting that a Sudanese court
sentenced a pregnant woman to death "when she refused to recant her Christian faith"); U.S.
Report on Religious Freedom in Middle East, WILSON CTR. (May 20, 2013), https://
www.wilsoncenter.org/article/us-report-religious-freedom-middle-east (reporting that in
Yemen, "[t]he [C]onstitution declares that Islam is the state religion" and that "other laws,
policies, and government practices restrict [freedom of religion]" and reporting that the Syrian
constitution "protect[s] religious freedom, although the government imposed restrictions on
this right").
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and variable even within U.S. territory.283 As Neuman emphasized, "the
functional approach does not present a binary choice between non-
application of a constitutional right and application of the right
precisely as it operates in an analogous domestic setting. Intermediate
positions with modified application of the right are also possible."284
One wonders, however, what an "intermediate" position might look like
when the challenged immigration policy denies entry based on one's
status as a Muslim. A person either belongs to the religion or does not,
and the government either discriminates on the basis of that
membership or does not.
An intermediate position under the functional approach may be
more easily applied to the liberty interests of would-be immigrants. For
example, "[t]he free speech rights of government employees, of soldiers,
and of citizens present on domestic military bases all undergo
adjustment to their circumstances."285 Likewise, the functional approach
contemplates flexibly authorizing the rejection of an immigrant or
refugee's application based on that applicant's past public anti-
American statements, even though such statements undoubtedly would
be protected under the First Amendment inside the United States. After
all, while one has free speech rights in the United States to criticize the
government, constitutional jurisprudence does not recognize critics of
America as a protected class under equal protection standards. This
example highlights where the flexibility of the functional approach
works well-in moderating the extraterritorial applicability of certain
fundamental liberty interests-and not so well-in moderating the
extraterritorial applicability of fundamental equality rights.286
In terms of practical obstacles, one additional factor to consider in
an adapted functional test is the extent to which affirmative government
intervention is required, which implicates resource and logistical
constraints. Whereas "[t]he right to habeas corpus is the right to
affirmative governmental intervention-the right to the benefit of a
governmental institution by which the U.S. judiciary exercises control
over custodians," the free exercise and establishment clauses primarily
283 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (establishing a three-part test to
determine whether a particular legislation violates the Establishment Clause, and setting forth
flexible factors to assist the determination, including the character and purpose of the
institution benefitted, the nature of the aid the state provides, and the resulting relationship
between the government and religious authorities).
284 Neuman, supra note 116, at 288.
285 Id.
286 Under such reasoning, the functional approach would appear to work particularly well in
the area of procedural rights, where domestic constitutional jurisprudence contemplates a
flexible continuum of procedural protections depending on the unique circumstances of the
case.
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involve negative duties of restraint.287 Extension" of protections
stemming from such negative duties of governmental restraint is
normatively consistent with structural separation of powers concerns
underlying the Court's extraterritorial jurisprudence and consistent
with a consequentialist perspective concerned with practical application
of rights beyond our borders.
Finally, the most important additional factor for any consideration
of extraterritorial applicability in the immigration context must be the
inherently political nature of immigration and refugee law and policy,
particularly to the extent that it affects sensitive foreign relations.288
While a more searching judicial inquiry may be appropriate where a
particularly blunt immigration policy appears untethered to either
national security interests or constitutional norms, deference to the
more knowledgeable political branches remains appropriate when a
sufficient showing has been made that national security, foreign
relations, or diplomatic efforts require curtailment of constitutional
protections in a certain situation.289
IV. TOWARDS A COHERENT EXTRATERRITORIAL IMMIGRATION
JURISPRUDENCE
Part III highlights the disparate strands of normative and
consequentialist theories underlying the Court's extraterritorial
jurisprudence and the vastly different results each theory, operating in
isolation, would yield in the immigration context. This Part attempts to
unify these disparate theories, first by identifying normative
commonality among them, and second by injecting some
consequentialist realism unique to the needs of extraterritorial
immigration law.
287 Neuman, supra note 116, at 287.
288 See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) ("The exclusion
of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty ... inherent in the executive power to control the
foreign affairs of the nation."); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320
(1936) (discussing "the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations").
289 Courts should remain vigilant, however, and invoke plenary power-like deference only
after a substantial showing by the government that an otherwise unconstitutional immigration
policy or decision serves important foreign relations purposes, lest plenary power reasoning
simply provide "a fallback or default set of legal justifications" to deny extraterritorial
constitutional rights. Hernindez-L6pez, supra note 204, at 195 (discussing the government's
reliance on immigration law to "preclude[] judicial remedies" to five Uighurs held at
Guantinamo Bay more than four years after Boumediene).
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A. A'Unified Theory of Extraterritorial Constitutional Law
When carefully considered, the fundamental individual rights
approach, structural separation of powers approach, and Justice
Brennan's broad social compact approach all share one important trait:
they contemplate some restraint on official government action when the
government engages with an individual abroad. The exact contours of
that restraint derive not from the physical location or the status of the
alien, but from the inherent limits on governmental power as expressed
in the Constitution.
As an initial matter, the individual rights/separation of powers
dichotomy is "elusive at best, if not downright illusory."290 Indeed, all of
the rights contained in the Bill of Rights can properly be cast as
limitations on government power, precisely because they involve the
right to be free from some oppressive or improper exercise of
government power. 291 The right of the person to be free from such
governmental power and the limit of the government to exercise such
power against the person are merely two sides of the same coin. Indeed,
the framers viewed the Bill of Rights in structural terms rather than in
terms of positive individual rights.292 When viewed in this light, it
becomes clear that all provisions of the Constitution, read holistically as
a constraint on government power, ought to apply "always and
everywhere."293
This view of extraterritorial applicability as one of a structural
restraint on government power is entirely consistent with Justice
Brennan's "mutuality of legal obligation" social compact theory from
Verdugo-Urquidez.294 According to Brennan, when the United States
government engages with an individual, whether at home or abroad,
and attempts to impose its will in any capacity, the government "has
treated him as a member of our community for purposes of enforcing
our laws. He has become, quite literally, one of the governed."295
290 Vladeck, supra note 238, at 276.
291 See Lobel, supra note 25, at 1656 ("Since both individual constitutional rights and
separation of powers provide restrictions and limitations on government power, it is unclear
why those two categories of constitutional limitations should result in differing extraterritorial
applicability.").
292 See Lobel, supra note 25, at 1655 ("Perhaps most fundamentally, many of the framers
viewed the original Constitution's limitations on federal power as rendering a Bill of Rights
unnecessary.").
293 Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 312 (1922).
294 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 284 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(plurality opinion); GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS,
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 7-8 (1996).
295 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 284.
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This approach squares with the view of many of the framers, who
"viewed the original Constitution's limitations on federal power as
rendering a Bill of Rights unnecessary."296 As Lobel cogently argued:
The framers saw these rights as protected by the structural
limitations imposed by the original Constitution. Had the Bill of
Rights never been enacted, aliens could have argued that the framers'
intent was not to accord the government the power to invade those
natural rights that pre-existed the Constitution and were structurally
protected by the Constitution's limited grant of power to the federal
government. It is implausible to claim that the enactment of the Bill
of Rights increased the Federal government's power over aliens
abroad by removing the structural restraints that the framers
believed they had enacted and replacing those limitations with
individual rights that would only protect certain classes of people.297
[B]y focusing on the power of a branch to act, structural restraints
relocate the inquiry away from who is being harmed and where that
person suffers the harm, and instead to whether the actor has
exceeded its power and jurisdiction to so act. The status of the person
harmed thus ought to play no role in the inquiry.298
This approach stands in stark contrast to the restrictive "significant
voluntary connection" social compact test of the Verdugo- Urquidez
plurality, which ought to be seen as a virtue. Not only does that test rely
upon unsupported and unworkable hurdles to constitutional protection
such as presence, duration, and societal obligation, but it also offends
basic notions of justice by imposing artificial barriers to constitutional
protection for noncitizens while giving the government a blank check to
do as it pleases in return. Indeed, post-Boumediene courts have invoked
this Verdugo-Urquidez significant voluntary connection test to deny
extraterritorial aliens the right to be free even from torture or
extrajudicial killing by agents of the federal government. 299
In sum, a normative extraterritorial approach grounded in a
structural governmental restraint theory finds deep support in the
framers' intent, the individual rights theory, the separation of powers
theory, and the broad social compact theory. However, taken to its
logical extreme, this approach would require the federal government to
act precisely in accordance with every provision of the Constitution in
every international context as it does domestically. Such a bright line
approach would ignore the diverse, on-the-ground realities of the U.S.
296 See Lobel, supra note 25, at 1655 (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 515 (Alexander
Hamilton)).
297 Lobel, supra note 25, at 1655-56.
298 Id. at 1653.
299 See Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 771-72 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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government's engagements around the globe and would risk usurping
fundamental sovereign powers from the political branches in the fields
of foreign policy, war, diplomacy, and immigration. Thus, there remains
a role for Justice Kennedy's functional approach in Boumediene to
temper the potentially impracticable and anomalous consequences of an
inflexible normative theory.300 How these normative and
consequentialist approaches merge in the area of extraterritorial
immigration law are considered below.
B. A Coherent and Practical Extraterritorial Constitutional
Immigration Law
Recognizing the need for normative consistency in extraterritorial
jurisprudence, the limits of Kennedy's functionalist approach to flexibly
adapt to certain unconstitutionally discriminatory conduct and the
unique deference traditionally enjoyed by the political branches in the
field of immigration law and policy, I submit the following three
proposals for a coherent and workable extraterritorial constitutional
immigration jurisprudence.
1. Universal Extraterritorial Application of Fundamental
Constitutional Equality Norms
Equality under the law stands as perhaps the oldest, most
fundamental principle of justice in Western Civilization.301 The classical
liberal tradition, from which our liberal constitutional democracy
springs, was premised on the fundamental notion that liberty can only
be secured through equal treatment under the law. 302
In recognition of the fundamental nature of the right to equal
treatment under the law, as well as the important governmental
restraints constitutional equality principles impose, the Constitution's
Equal Protection provisions of the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
300 Boumnediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 759 (2008).
301 At the 431 B.C.E. funeral oration of Pericles, the following statement was recorded: "If we
look to the laws, they afford equal justice to all in their private differences; if no social standing,
advancement in public life falls to reputation for capacity, class considerations not being
allowed to interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way ... S. see THUCYDIDES,
THE HISTORY OF THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR (Richard Crawley trans., Longmans, Green & Co.
1874) (431 B.C.).
302 See Chandran Kukathas, Ethical Pluralism from a Classical Liberal Perspective, in THE
MANY AND THE ONE: RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR PERSPECTIVES ON ETHICAL PLURALISM IN THE
MODERN WORLD 55, 61 (Richard Madsen & Tracy B. Strong eds., 2003); see also JOHN LOCKE,
Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 114-26 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960).
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Amendments should apply universally whenever and wherever the U.S.
government acts. Moreover, these protections should apply to
whomever purports to have been unfairly treated by the government.
This proposal contemplates the extraterritorial application of equal
protection precisely as it operates in the analogous domestic setting.303 If
a domestic law receives heightened scrutiny because it affects a
protected class under Equal Protection jurisprudence, the same law
would receive the same heightened scrutiny in the international
immigration context. For example, no domestic law providing for
disparate treatment of citizens on the basis of race or religious affiliation
would ever pass muster under contemporary constitutional norms,
absent a governmental showing that a compelling justification existed
for that treatment and a no more narrowly tailored process could
achieve the desired result.304 Neither should an immigration policy.
At first blush, this proposal would seem to completely upend
immigration law and policy, which largely function on the premise that
certain classes of people are allowed entry into the country and others
are not. But virtually all laws "draw a distinction among people and thus
are potentially susceptible to an equal protection challenge .... [T]he
issue is whether the government can identify a sufficiently important
objective for its discrimination."305 The level of judicial review employed
in such circumstances depends on the type of discrimination
contemplated.
Indeed, though potentially far-reaching, this proposal merely
reflects the historical application of the political branches' plenary
power under a contemporary constitutional norms analysis. The
government once denied aliens entry on the basis of race at a time when
it discriminated domestically on the basis of race; the government once
denied aliens entry on the basis of religion at a time when it
discriminated domestically on the basis of religion; and the government
once denied aliens entry on the basis of sexual orientation at a time
when it discriminated domestically on the basis of sexual orientation.306
To the extent this proposal seems radically out of step with prior
303 This approach contrasts with Neuman's suggestion that extraterritorial constitutional
application need not precisely mirror domestic extraterritorial application. See Neuman, supra
note 116, at 288 ("It may bear repetition that the functional approach does not present a binary
choice between nonapplication of a constitutional right and application of the right precisely as
it operates in an analogous domestic setting.").
304 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (articulating strict scrutiny standard for
race-based classifications).
305 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 669 (4th ed.
2011) ("For example, those under age 16 might claim to be discriminated against by the age
requirement for obtaining a driver's license ... the issue is whether the government can identify
a sufficiently important objective for its discrimination.").
306 See Chin, supra note 20, at 259.
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precedents, it is less that it meaningfully changes immigration policy
than it codifies foi the first time a universal extraterritorial application
of a constitutional "right." But properly viewed, this proposal merely
reinforces the uncontroversial proposition that the government can only
act in ways consistent with the Constitution, whether it acts at home or
abroad.307
No intermediate approach guided by Boumediene-style practical
considerations is needed for the extraterritorial application of
fundamental equality norms. Indeed, no intermediate approach is
possible in this context when the only constitutional question is whether
the government may or may not discriminate on the basis of a particular
classification.
2. Extraterritorial Application of Fundamental Substantive
Liberty Interests, Moderated as Needed by Foreign Policy and Other
Practical Considerations
Like equal protection principles, fundamental liberty principles
operate both as individual rights and as structural governmental
restraints. Moreover, the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and property
are inherent not just in the constitutional DNA of our nation, but
indeed form the very bedrock of international jus cogens norms.308
Normatively, then, it appears these fundamental liberty interests should
apply extraterritorially in the same way as fundamental equality
interests-namely, universally. There exists one significant difference
between equality and liberty for purposes of extraterritoriality, however.
Crudely put, equality is binary: one is either treated equally or
unequally. The unequal treatment is not necessarily unconstitutional
but must be justified. But liberty exists on a continuum: one's free
speech rights may be curtailed a little, a lot, or entirely. 309 And each level
307 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (plurality opinion) ("[T]he Government may act only as the Constitution
authorizes, whether the actions in question are foreign or domestic." (citing Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 6 (1957))).
308 See THOMAS WEATHERALL, JUS COGENS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND SOCIAL CONTRACT
432 (2015) (observing that the fundamental norms of life, liberty, and property have been
universally recognized as bedrocks of human rights since the time of Locke and Rousseau);
Moore & Moore, supra note 138, at 23 (finding that the concept of fundamental liberty interests
"has gone beyond the U.S. Constitution and has become an important, widely accepted norm at
international law. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights specifically states that 'everyone
has the right to life, liberty and the security of person."' (quoting G.A. Res. 217 (III) A,
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948))).
309 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (reaffirming that the political
branches may permissibly restrict speech at certain times, in certain places, and in a certain
manner).
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of curtailment may be constitutionally justified, depending on the
circumstances.310
Therefore, given the more inherently flexible nature of liberty
interests and their domestically differing treatment by courts depending
on case-by-case circumstances, the extraterritorial application of these
fundamental interests ought also to be susceptible to a functionalist
approach. Under this rubric, the default position of a court would be to
presume extraterritorial application of a fundamental substantive liberty
interest subject to consideration of whether such extraterritorial
applicability would be impractical and anomalous.311
In the immigration context, substantive liberty interests likely
would be implicated less frequently than constitutional equality
protections. For the immigrant or refugee seeking admission, the
substantive issue almost universally concerns whether the applicant
should be admitted, and the substantive constitutional claim arising
from any denial almost universally concerns whether the applicant was
denied admission based on his membership in a particular suspect
classification. Denial of admission rarely turns on whether and to what
extent the applicant has participated in a constitutionally protected
activity.
In the unusual instance where the exercise of a substantive
constitutional right does bear on an applicant's admissibility-such as in
the free speech example discussed above312-greater judicial deference
should be paid to the political branches in determining the scope of
extraterritorial constitutional protection. While the government's desire
to exclude an individual based solely on his inherent membership in a
protected class ought to be reviewed with the strictest of scrutiny, the
government's desire to exclude an individual based on his voluntary
engagement in unsavory activity deserves greater deference, even if that
activity would otherwise be constitutionally protected on American soil.
3. Extraterritorial Application of Procedural Due Process
Interests, Moderated as Needed by Foreign Policy and Other Practical
Considerations
Unlike equal protection principles, which are binary in nature and
not easily susceptible to a functional, case-by-case approach, procedural
310 Id. at 791, 794 (finding that time, place, and manner restrictions are permissible if they
are content neutral, narrowly tailored, serve an important governmental interest, and leave
open ample alternative channels for communication).
311 See Reid, 354 U.S. at 75 (Harlan, J., concurring).
312 See supra Section IV.D.2.
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due process protections are perhaps the most flexible and adaptable of
all constitutional rights. Indeed, the Court's own procedural due process
jurisprudence contemplates a three-factor balancing test to determine
what exact procedural protections are required in specific
circumstances.313 Such a flexible approach to procedural due process is
especially appropriate in the extraterritorial context, where U.S.
government action abroad takes place in various states of instability,
urgency, and political tension.
That said, basic procedural due process norms-such as the right
for some level of review-are increasingly recognized as a fundamental
component of international human rights.314 This recognition that some
measure of procedural due process is as important as the protection of
substantive equality or liberty interests again suggests that some
universal extraterritorial application of procedural due process
protections is appropriate.315
Therefore, as with substantive liberty interests, courts should
presume in all extraterritorial circumstances that noncitizens have some
constitutional due process rights, but the exact scope and contours of
those rights need not precisely mirror the protections afforded in
domestic proceedings. In the immigration context, courts should
assume that summary rejection or revocation of a status without any
procedural protections violates constitutional principles,316 and beyond
this minimal threshold apply the functional approach on a case-by-case
313 See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 336 (1976) (holding that the amount due process
protections constitutionally require depends on the interests of the individual threatened with
government action, the risk of error through the procedures used and probable value of any
additional safeguards, and the cost and administrative burden of implementing the additional
procedures).
314 See generally Neuman, supra note 126 (discussing the concept of "global due process");
see also Moore & Moore, supra note 138, at 23 ("The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights . .. provides that 'everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent
national tribunals for acts [that] violate the fundamental rights [that are] granted [to a person
either] by the Constitution or by law."' (quoting G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948))).
315 See Moore & Moore, supra note 138, at 25 ("The idea of providing for due process as a
requirement at international law is a concept that has been widely adopted.").
316 To the extent this proposal conflicts with decades-old plenary power precedent that
whatever process Congress authorizes for an immigrant "is due process as far as an alien denied
entry is concerned," Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953), I
submit that this proposal does not conflict with "contemporary constitutional norms"
regarding procedural due process. Since Mezei was decided in 1953, the Court has found that
the Constitution requires the availability of court-appointed attorneys for indigent criminal
defendants, and in-person merit hearings for a range of administrative proceedings including
denial of welfare benefits, parental termination proceedings, medical license revocation
proceedings, and civil commitment proceedings. An immigration decision made summarily
without any review or procedure whatsoever likewise would run afoul of such contemporary
constitutional norms.
1188
FROM GUANTANAMO TO SYRIA
basis to determine what exact protections are necessary to ensure
constitutional fairness that is neither impracticable nor anomalous in
the given situation.
CONCLUSION
A perfect storm is brewing for extraterritorial constitutional
immigration jurisprudence. The Court recently has expressed an
increased willingness to scrutinize immigration decisions that test the
limits of the plenary power doctrine. The Court also recently expanded
constitutional protections for certain noncitizens outside the territorial
boundaries of the United States. Now, President Trump has promised to
enact constitutionally suspect immigration policies that both test the
limits of plenary power and affect millions of noncitizen immigrants
abroad.
This Article makes a first attempt at squarely linking the previously
parallel doctrines of immigration plenary power and extraterritorial
constitutional law to examine what may happen in future court cases
and to offer modest proposals for how to approach these unsettled and
difficult issues. While the political branches' power over immigration
remains broad and the extraterritorial extension of constitutional
provisions remains limited and uneven, we may very well have entered a
new era that will bring the comparative reach of these doctrines closer
together. Whether any immigrants affected by extreme vetting will fit
within this doctrinal Venn diagram remains to be seen.
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